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ABSTRACT 
 
JESSE ABDENOUR: The Face of Investigative News: A Mixed-Method Analysis of Local 
Television Investigative Journalism Content, Perceptions and Influences 
 (Under the direction of Daniel Riffe) 
 
 Investigative journalism is seen as the most important form of news reporting, but many 
fear it has declined because of economic considerations. This dissertation addresses gaps in the 
literature by empirically analyzing the quantity and quality of investigative journalism 
production within the most popular news format, local television. The project also examines 
organizational and market factors that influence investigative productivity. 
 A content analysis of local TV newscasts showed that investigative quantity and quality 
were generally low. Of the long-form stories coded (N=398), about one in five was presented as 
investigative by the producing station, and approximately one in nine was actually investigative 
by definition (less than half the stories presented as investigative were investigative by 
definition). In addition, a majority of the stations sampled (N=80) produced no investigative 
journalism of any kind during the sample week of newscasts. However, an accompanying survey 
showed that more than half of local television investigative reporters thought investigative 
production was increasing at their stations. 
 Ownership of a station by a publicly traded corporation was strongly associated with 
higher investigative productivity; corporate stations produced more news that was presented as 
investigative and placed greater perceived emphasis on investigative reporting compared to 
 iv
privately owned stations. This finding is in stark contrast to literature touting the negative effect 
of corporations on news, and has ramifications for future study of news organizations. 
 A station’s perceived emphasis on profit predicted less perceived station emphasis on 
investigative reporting, but profit emphasis was not related to stations’ actual investigative 
productivity in the content analysis. Larger news staffs also predicted greater investigative 
emphasis, but staff size was not related to actual investigative productivity. Market size and 
competition level did not significantly predict investigative productivity or investigative 
emphasis. 
  This dissertation provides support to those who charge that local television is providing 
little quality “watchdog” reporting, but also indicates that investigative journalists are optimistic 
about their craft, which has borne the brunt of newsroom cutbacks in recent years. It also 
uncovers clues that could help researchers determine the particular circumstances under which 
investigative journalism is produced at the local level. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Locally televised investigative journalism has helped countless communities learn the 
truth about their leaders. Investigators at local TV stations have taken on every aspect of society 
– from government and politics to education and sports – and their stories often help create 
positive change (Downie, 2012). The significance of local investigations can be felt in 
Cincinnati, where last year WCPO revealed that 9-1-1 operators were putting lives at risk by 
working without proper medical training (RTDNA, 2014); in Tampa, where WFTS showed that 
state workers were declaring elderly people “incapacitated” so officials could sell their homes for 
big profits; in smaller markets like Columbia, SC, where WLTX found widespread negligence in 
the department of social services that coincided with the death of one foster child (duPont Award 
Winners, 2015); and in Wilmington, NC, where last year WECT discovered that county 
prosecutors were dismissing almost half of their DWI cases, often putting dangerous repeat 
offenders back on the road (Evans, 2014). These investigative stories, like many others, led to 
firings, resignations, policy changes, new laws, trials, and convictions. 
 In addition to their propensity for impact, investigative stories help democracies function 
effectively because they inform citizens about their leaders (Blasi, 1977; Siebert, Peterson, & 
Schramm, 1956). Journalism professor and former Washington Post editor Leonard Downie, Jr., 
said, “No matter how unpopular the news media may sometimes be, there has been, ever since 
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Watergate, an expectation that the press would hold accountable those with power and influence 
over the rest of us” (Downie, 2012). The “watchdog” ethos that investigative news represents is 
extremely important to consumers (Jones, 2013; Rowe, 2011), journalists (Willnat & Weaver, 
2014), and news managers (Jones, 2013). It is seen as the standard for excellence in American 
journalism, against which all other reporting is judged (Aucoin, 1997). 
 Local television investigations in particular have great potential for impact, due to the 
medium’s popularity. Local TV is the top news source for adults in America, reaching the 
broadest audience in terms of size, diversity, and socioeconomic status (“Local News Interest,” 
2015; Mitchell, 2014; Olmstead, Jurkowitz, Mitchell, & Enda, 2013; Potter, Matsa, & Mitchell, 
2013; Waldman, 2011). Audiences turn to local television first for local political news 
(Rosenstiel, Mitchell, Purcell, & Rainie, 2011), and often trust local TV presenters more than 
print journalists (Graber & Dunaway, 2015). 
 But many fear investigative journalism has declined sharply because of the recent 
economic downturn and profit considerations (Coronel, 2013; Lozano, 2010; Walton, 2010; 
Waldman, 2011). Though journalists and news managers highly value investigations, most think 
their news outlets are not getting the proper resources to conduct them (Jones, 2013; Holcomb, 
Mitchell, & Purcell, 2015). Scholars (Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013), media critics 
(Downie, 2012; Lewis, 2014), and even television news directors (Jessell, 2012) think local TV 
investigative reporters are doing a poor job. Former investigative television reporter Joe 
Bergantino said investigative cutbacks at local stations deprive citizens of valuable information: 
“they’re not getting the kind of information they need from television news to hold the 
government accountable, and the powerful accountable, and to be informed citizens in a 
democracy” (Waldman, 2011, p. 88). 
 3
 The apparently tenuous status of investigative journalism on local television raises certain 
questions: first, how much investigative journalism is being produced on local TV? Second, what 
is the quality of that journalism? And third, of the investigative reporting that is being done, what 
factors contribute to its production? These are empirical questions that largely have not been 
answered. The current project addresses these gaps in the literature by analyzing the amount and 
quality of investigative journalism at local television stations across the U.S., and how certain 
ownership and market variables affect investigative productivity. This examination utilizes a 
survey of investigative reporters, a content analysis of local TV newscasts, and a market and 
organizational analysis to address these issues.  
The second chapter of this dissertation explains why investigative journalism is 
particularly useful to society and democracy, examining definitions of investigative journalism 
and larger trends in its production. The third chapter looks at the investigative news process 
through the prism of Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) hierarchy of news influences, predicting 
how various micro- and macro-level dynamics might constrain investigative news. While an 
organizational emphasis on profit might limit investigative journalism, organizational structure 
and size might encourage its production. Additionally, exogenous factors like competition and 
market size may stimulate investigative reporting. The fourth chapter lists the project’s specific 
research questions and hypotheses, and the fifth chapter describes the methods of analysis. 
Chapter six presents analysis results, and chapter seven discusses these results along with final 
conclusions and recommendations for researchers and journalists. 
Because there is a limited body of academic knowledge concerning television news, 
especially television investigative news, several studies of print and online journalism are 
included in the literature review to provide context. While TV is undoubtedly a different medium 
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with different demands and routines, commercial television stations face many of the same 
constraints as commercial print and online outlets. In addition, older seminal works about 
television production and investigative journalism are cited because of their importance to the 
field, and also because of a limited amount of recent relevant scholarly material in this area. 
Many of the same issues, attitudes, and work practices in local TV news from twenty years ago 
are still relevant today (see, e.g., Baran, 2011; Belt & Just, 2008; Graber & Dunaway, 2015; 
Jurkowitz et al., 2013). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM 
 
Definition and Classification 
Investigative news provides surveillance of powerful interests, including public entities, 
such as governments, and private entities, such as corporations (de Burgh, 2008; Protess, Cook, 
Doppelt, Ettema, Gordon, Leff, & Miller, 1991). It embodies the traditional “watchdog” function 
of the press integral to the First Amendment (Blasi, 1977). The Founding Fathers sought to 
establish the press as an independent entity capable of providing a “check” on government forces 
(Blasi, 1977; McManus, 1990; Siebert et al., 1956). The press’ primary duty was to be the 
“watchdog over the workings of democracy, ever vigilant to spot and expose any arbitrary or 
authoritarian practice” (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 56). Legal scholar Vincent Blasi (1977) said 
speech that “checks” the abuse of official power, such as investigative journalism, is the most 
valuable form of free expression and should receive the highest legal protection.  
Investigative reporting often provides useful information about government officials, 
helping citizens make reasonable choices and sustain democracy (Blasi, 1977; Siebert et al., 
1956). Consumption of political news and access to local reporting are associated with greater 
political participation, including voting (Filla & Johnson, 2010; Hamilton, 2004). Investigative 
journalism, in particular, has the potential to mobilize public opinion and generate government 
action (de Burgh, 2008; Downie, 2012; Ettema & Glasser, 1998; Protess et al., 1991). 
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Investigative reporters often seek to enact political or social change through their reporting 
(Ettema & Glasser, 1998; Protess et al., 1991). 
Good investigative journalism “afflicts the comfortable and comforts the afflicted” 
(Houston, 2009; Kovach, Rosenstiel, & Kohut, 2001), and its reporters are often guided by an 
ethical duty to expose wrongdoing (Aucoin, 2006; Houston, 2009). Driven by moral “outrage” 
(Ettema & Glasser, 1998; Protess et al., 1991), investigative reporters “champion the weak” and 
“accuse the guilty” (de Burgh, 2008, p. 19). Ettema and Glasser (1998) identified three properties 
of successful investigative journalism: “publicity,” whereby reporters bring an issue to light with 
the intent of fixing the problem; “accountability,” in which those responsible for the problem are 
held accountable and given an opportunity to reply; and “solidarity,” in which the reporter 
establishes an empathetic link between the “victim” of the story and the media consumer (p. 
189). 
Most official definitions of investigative journalism are variations on a description 
written in 1983 by Robert Greene, former assistant managing editor of Newsday: 
 
 “The reporting, through one’s own work product and initiative, of matters of importance 
which some persons or organizations wish to keep secret. The three basic elements are that the 
investigation be the work of the reporter, not a report of an investigation made by someone else; 
that the subject of the story involves something of reasonable importance to the reader or viewer; 
and that others are attempting to hide these matters from the public” (Ullmann & Honeyman, 
1983, pp. vii-viii).  
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Those three themes (original work, public importance, and concealed information) have 
been used frequently in subsequent definitions of investigative reporting (see, e.g., Aucoin, 2006; 
Bernt & Greenwald, 2000; Blevens, 1997). Ullmann (1995) called Greene’s definition the “best” 
description of investigative journalism (p. 2), and a similar definition is used today by the 
Investigative Reporters and Editors organization: “The reporting, through one’s own initiative 
and work product, of matters of importance to readers, viewers or listeners. In many cases, the 
subjects of the reporting wish the matters under scrutiny to remain undisclosed” (Investigative 
Reporters and Editors, 2015). Each of Greene’s three themes is described in detail in the 
following section. 
 Original Work. Many scholars take this to mean that the reporter did his or her own 
“digging” to get the story (Cordell, 2009; Houston, 2009; Ullman, 1995). Aucoin (2006) held 
that investigative reporting reveals information “through the original, time-consuming ‘digging’ 
of the reporter for the purposes of inspiring reform” (p. 91). Inherent in this process is that the 
reporter did not simply accept information offered through the typical authoritative channels; he 
or she went beyond allegation or denial to establish facts that either substantiate or refute official 
claims (Blevens, 1997; de Burgh, 2008; Knight, 2007; Protess et al., 1991; Spark, 1999; 
Williams, 1978). Ettema and Glasser (1998) postulated that it is the investigative journalist’s job 
to “look beyond what is conventionally acceptable, behind the interpretations of events provided 
for us by authorities and the authoritative” (p. 3). An example of this would be an investigative 
reporter’s interviewing of enlisted men and women to establish that rape and sexual harassment 
within the armed forces is tolerated, despite denials by military officials. 
 Concealed Information. The second commonly held aspect of Greene’s definition is that 
the information revealed through the reporter’s initiative was concealed from the public (Aucoin, 
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2006; Cordell, 2009; Houston, 2009; Ullman & Honeyman, 1983). Benjaminson and Anderson 
(1990) declared that concealed information is the sine qua non of investigative reporting; without 
this element, reporting is not investigative. Greene’s definition specified that someone must be 
actively trying to hide the information that is revealed (Ullman & Honeyman, 1983). This 
requirement of deliberate suppression is also stipulated by Williams (1978) and de Burgh (2008), 
but has mostly fallen out of favor with researchers. A more common and less strict definition of 
the “concealed information” characteristic is that the information was hidden from the public, but 
was not necessarily suppressed (Blevens, 1997; Knight, 2007). Several investigative scholars 
have held that the revelation of concealed information could be from a reporter’s original 
discovery of patterns in complex records or public data (Bernt & Greenwald, 2000; Defleur, 
1997; Knight, 2007). An example of this would be an investigative reporter looking through 
hundreds of hours of police dashboard camera videos in order to establish a pattern of racial 
profiling (Berry, 2009). 
 Public Interest. The third aspect of Greene’s investigative definition, that the story topic 
must be important to audiences, is nearly universal (see, e.g, Aucoin, 2006; de Burgh, 2008; 
DeFleur, 1997; Cordell, 2009; Houston, 2009; Protess et al., 1991) but is the toughest to define. 
Gaber (2008) claimed that substantive investigative journalism must be in the “public interest,” 
drawing a difference between stories that are merely interesting and stories that are in the 
public’s interest to make known (p. 245). For example, a story about life inside a private prison 
might be interesting, but not necessarily in the public interest. On the other hand, a story about a 
large drug company distorting trial results to conceal a drug’s link to teen suicide would be in the 
public’s interest (Gaber, 2008). 
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 Investigative reports that are important to audiences almost always involve harm – the 
reporter reveals that the “villain,” or “target,” of the story has caused harm to a “victim” (Bernt 
& Greenwald, 2000; de Burgh, 2008; Protess et al., 1991; Ruehlman, 1977; Ullman 1995). Truly 
investigative stories involve villains who are in authoritative positions and have abused that 
authority (Northmore, 1996; Protess et al., 1991). Conflicts between individuals are usually not 
investigative, whereas conflicts between individuals and the state often are (Northmore, 1996). 
An example of the former is a consumer-centered story, such as when a small company charges a 
customer for services not rendered. Northmore (1996) maintains that individual conflicts often 
result in “trite foot-in-the-door TV investigations,” and that truly investigative reporting should 
be “a little alarming to anyone in power” (pp. 10-11). Impactful investigations can also be 
alarming to the news outlets that produce them because of potential lawsuits (Ullman, 1995). 
Investigative villains can be public entities such as government officials who misuse 
taxpayer money, or private entities such as large companies that manufacture dangerous toys (de 
Burgh, 2008; Gaber, 2008; Protess et al., 1991). De Burgh (2008) held that it is the “quality of 
the target” that distinguishes investigative journalism (p. 15). For example, an athlete arrested for 
marijuana possession is a low-quality target; a legislator who accepted bribes in order to promote 
a bill in Congress is a high-quality target. Ettema and Glasser (1998) found that “an investigative 
journalist will choose stories that transcend the facts of a particular case and illustrate a broader 
trend or failure of a system” (p. 3). However, Cordell (2009), de Burgh (2008), and Houston 
(2009) all maintained that villains can be singular (e.g., a rogue city official) or collective (e.g., 
the city government system). Similarly, victims can be singular (e.g., one man sent to prison for 
a crime he didn’t commit) or collective (e.g., taxpayers who saw their money wasted by a corrupt 
official). 
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Building from the preceding literature, the present project defines an investigative news 
story as one that: a) is a piece of original work by the presenting news organization; b) reveals 
information that was either purposely suppressed, concealed by law, or was public but was 
compiled by the reporter in a way that exposes a widespread pattern; and c) is in the public’s 
interest because a powerful entity caused harm to a citizen or citizens. 
The State of Investigative Journalism 
Because this dissertation looks for clues in determining the state of local television 
investigative journalism, trends associated with this type of reporting are analyzed. The 
following section looks at broad patterns in local television news, investigative journalism, and 
the related “hard” news genre. 
 Local TV Trends. Local television is the number one news source for Americans (“How 
Americans Get”, 2014; Lewis, 2014; “Local News Interest,” 2015; Mitchell, 2014; Olmstead et 
al., 2013; Waldman, 2011). About 90% of U.S. adults watch local TV news at least occasionally 
(Mitchell, 2014), more than 70% watch it over the course of a month (Olmstead et al., 2013), and 
about 50% watch it regularly (“In Changing News,” 2012). When polled last year, 82% of adults 
said they had watched local television in the past week – more than any other news source 
(“How Americans Get”, 2014). Local TV viewership declined steadily from 2009 to 2012 
(Mitchell, 2014), but has increased each of the past two years (Matsa, 2015). As a comparison, 
only 20 to 30% of the U.S. population has access to an all-news cable channel (Lewis, 2014). 
Despite local television’s popularity, many stations slashed their budgets during the past 
decade (Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; Waldman 2011). Local TV news pre-tax profits fell 
by 50% from 1998 to 2008, with stations in smaller towns seeing the largest decline (Waldman, 
2011). However, budgets have bounced back because of strong commercial sales. Total on-air ad 
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revenue for local stations (including advertisements for news shows and non-news shows) 
reached $20 billion in 2014, up 7% from the year before (Matsa, 2015). News shows generate 
the lion’s share of that money. In 1994, the typical local TV station got about 16% of its revenue 
from sales of commercials that aired during newscasts (McManus, 1994). By 2014, that number 
had more than tripled; Papper (2014b) reported that the average station got 50% of its revenue 
from news, the highest percentage ever recorded in the yearly RTDNA/Hofstra University 
survey. Additionally, the number of local stations that experienced news budget increases went 
from 38% in 2012 to 52% in 2014 (Papper 2014b). 
News content has increased along with news revenue. Local TV news now produces a 
large amount of content on a variety of platforms (Potter, Matsa, & Mitchell, 2013; Reinardy & 
Bacon, 2014). In 2014, the number of U.S. stations producing original local news increased from 
the previous year for the first time in a decade, and the amount of local news produced per 
station had increased to five hours on an average weekday (Papper, 2014a). Additionally, the 
percentage of local TV news directors who expected news staff increases went from 43% in 
2013 to 52% in 2014 (Papper, 2014b). 
 Hard News Trends in Local TV. But does more TV news mean more quality news, and 
by extension, more “hard” and investigative news? Some scholars (see, e.g., Hamilton, 2004; 
Higgins-Dobney, 2013) believe the opposite: that more television news equals more “soft” news. 
In contrast to hard news, which takes more effort and is more socially and politically relevant 
(Belt & Just, 2008; Reinemann, Stanyer, Scherr, & Legnante, 2012), soft news often takes less 
effort, is cheaper to produce, and typically includes sensational aspects (Belt & Just, 2008; 
Jacobs, 1990; Kaniss, 1991; McManus, 1994, 2009). Examples of hard news include stories on 
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government action and politics, while soft news examples include stories on celebrities and 
leisure activities. 
In its early stages, television news was generally of the hard variety. News programs 
were a way for stations to fulfill Federal Communications Commission (FCC) performance 
regulations requiring fair and balanced coverage of issues of public importance. Newscasts were 
seen as “loss leaders,” generating prestige but little revenue (Westin, 2000, p. 3; see also, 
Barnouw, 1993; Friendly, 1967).  Beginning in the 1970s, however, television managers realized 
that local news could be highly profitable if sensational and visual stories were highlighted, often 
at the expense of public service reporting (Jacobs, 1990; McManus, 1994; Westin, 2000). By the 
1980s, broadcast deregulation had stripped the FCC’s “public service” mandate of much of its 
power, although its ethos still pervades the profession (Baran, 2011; Graber & Dunaway, 2015). 
A large body of research in the past 20 years indicates that hard news on local TV has 
been in decline (see, e.g., Coulson, Riffe, Lacy, & St. Cyr, 2001; Hamilton, 2004; “Informing 
Communities,” 2009; Jurkowitz et al., 2013; Lacy, Wildman, Fico, Bergan, Baldwin, & Zube, 
2013; McManus, 1994; Riffe & Abdenour, 2015; Riffe & Holm, 1999). Waldman (2011) said 
TV coverage of local elections is weak, and posited that a lack of local accountability reporting 
could cause a deterioration of local communities: “The independent watchdog function that the 
Founding Fathers envisioned for journalism—going so far as to call it crucial to a healthy 
democracy—is in some cases at risk at the local level” (p. 5). A decline in hard news on local TV 
would be significant because of the medium’s popularity as a source for public affairs 
information (Belt & Just, 2008). While newspaper is the most popular medium for civic news 
topics such as local government, community events, and social services, local television is the 
most relied-upon medium for local political news (Rosenstiel, Mitchell, Purcell, & Rainie, 2011).  
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In an analysis of local TV newscasts in 2002, Yanich (2012) concluded that the amount 
of public affairs coverage was small across the board; just 8-12% of stories involved government 
or politics (Yanich, 2012). Jurkowitz et al. (2013) reported a 50% decrease in local TV coverage 
of politics and government during an eight-year span – in 2005, those topics constituted 6% of 
local TV news airtime; by 2013, that number was 3%. During the same time period, local TV 
coverage of weather, traffic, sports, accidents and disasters increased. If hard news is indeed 
declining, local television investigative journalism, which is mostly hard news, may be suffering 
as well.  
However, Belt and Just (2008) found that local TV news was not entirely the “vast 
wasteland” critics assumed it to be (p. 200). About 25% of stories in their national sample were 
considered “important,” focusing on significant political and community issues. The authors also 
found local news to be “very local,” with more than 60% of TV stories being relevant to their 
respective communities (Belt & Just, 2008, p. 200). Although Waldman (2011) cited an overall 
lack of substance in local television news, he did acknowledge that a few stations were still 
producing high-quality journalism of “tremendous value” to their communities, including, for 
example, WFAA in Dallas and WKRN in Nashville (p. 79). 
 Investigative Trends in Local TV. Similar to hard news trends, numerous researchers 
and practitioners indicate that investigative journalism has been on a steady decline in the past 
decade due to profit pressures (see, e.g., Cordell, 2009; Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; Ide 
& Vashisht, 2006; Jessell, 2012; Poitras & Sutter, 2009; Waldman, 2011). Sandy Rowe (2011), 
former editor of the Portland Oregonian newspaper, said local journalists in television and print 
“do not produce enough accountability reporting to fully engage and empower citizens,” 
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jeopardizing the public’s ability to hold government, business and civic leaders accountable (pp. 
2-3). 
A 1991 survey of more than 900 print and television investigative journalists showed that 
a majority thought the news media had become less committed to investigative journalism 
(Protess et al., 1991). Membership in the Investigative Reporters and Editors (IRE) organization 
dropped more than 30% from 2003 (5,391) to 2009 (3,695), although the organization now 
claims to have more than 5,000 members (“Job Listings,” 2015). This year, 88% of IRE 
members listed decreasing newsroom resources as their number-one concern (Holcomb et al., 
2015). 
Many point to the recent emergence of “nonprofit muckraking organizations” such as 
ProPublica or the New England Center for Investigative Reporting as proof that investigative 
journalism in traditional media has declined (Coronel, 2013; Jurkowitz, 2014; Graber & 
Dunaway, 2015; Rowe, 2011). These nonprofit online outfits help fill the investigative void 
when budgets are cut, but are less sustainable than commercial outlets because they generate less 
revenue (Waldman, 2011). In the newspaper realm, Ide and Vashisht (2006) found that 
investigative staffing was very low; more than 60% of newspapers had no investigative editor 
and almost 40% had no full-time investigative reporters.  
Investigative journalism on local TV has also shown signs of deterioration. In a survey of 
local TV news directors, Just, Levine, Regan, and Dean (2002) reported a five-year decline in 
investigative television reporting: 25% of news stations did no investigative work whatsoever, 
and only one of every 150 stories contained original “watchdog” reporting. Waldman (2011) 
surmised that profit pressures had severely reduced the number of in-depth “watchdog” stories at 
local TV stations, and Jessell (2012) reported that 82% of local TV news directors said their 
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stations did an “average” or “poor” job of investigative journalism. More than 80% of news 
directors said that criticism of local TV investigative reporting was “fair,” and less than 40% 
expected to see more investigative work at their stations in the next three to five years (Jessell, 
2012).  
A study by Jurkowitz et al. (2013) suggested a recent dip in local television enterprise 
journalism (high-effort reporting that can be similar to investigative work). Local TV airtime 
dedicated to pre-edited “package” stories, which take more effort and tend to be longer, 
decreased by 20% from 2005 to 2012, and the proportion of stories lasting more than a minute 
dropped from 31% in 2002 to 20% in 2012 (Jurkowitz et al., 2013). Scott, Gobetz, and Chanslor 
(2008) determined that the amount of local news produced was an indicator of quality; thus, a 
drop in the length of local stories could mean a drop in quality. 
 One reason stories might be getting shorter is because stations have to do more with 
fewer reporters (Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; Jurkowitz et al., 2013). The amount of TV 
news has increased, while staffing has remained largely the same or decreased slightly in recent 
years (Papper, 2014b). Shorter stories and overworked staffs are not conducive to investigative 
reports, which tend to be long and take time to build (Houston, 2009). Higgins-Dobney and 
Sussman (2013) found lack of staffing to be a major problem for investigative reporting at 
television stations in Portland, OR. In what the authors believed to be a nationwide trend, 
executives had slashed station budgets, consolidated news operations, and increased demands on 
reporters. Many investigative journalists had to double as general assignment reporters and were 
expected to produce stories daily: “there is little or no time permitted to investigate stories in-
depth or add creativity to storytelling...often, what passes for investigative reporting involves 
nothing more than making a few phone calls” (Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013, p. 857). 
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Barnhurst (2011) found that the time crunch had hit television news especially hard, “where 
competitive pressures to go live have left journalists without time to investigate or even edit their 
work” (p. 99).  
 However, there is hope for investigative journalism, which is highly valued by audiences, 
journalists, and news managers (Jones, 2013; Rowe, 2011; Willnat & Weaver, 2014). A 2013 
national poll found that news consumers ranked investigative reporting as the second-most 
important of 15 news categories (Jones, 2013). More than half the consumers in the survey had a 
“high interest” in investigative journalism. In the same study, a majority of news executives said 
their organizations were “very committed” to investigative reports (Jones, 2013). Several top 
local television ownership groups, including Gannett, Post-Newsweek, and Raycom Media, have 
publicly stated the importance of investigative reporting (Waldman, 2011). 
 Willnat and Weaver’s (2014) latest American Journalist survey found that journalists 
valued the government “watchdog” role more than ever. When asked about the importance of 
different media roles, 78% of journalists said “investigating government claims” was extremely 
important, which was the highest level of perceived importance for that role since the surveys 
began 40 years ago (Willnat & Weaver, 2014, p. 14). Many journalists realize their strengths lie 
in providing investigative reports, especially now that they are competing with online sources 
that can distribute information instantly (Willnat and Weaver, 2014). Marci Burdick, an 
executive at Schurz Communications, which owns several local TV stations, said her company 
has retained many of its award-winning investigative units because they provide information 
people can’t get anywhere else: “companies covering car wrecks and traffic accidents are 
kidding themselves if they think they are going to survive in the Internet Age because that 
information can be gotten by anyone with an iPhone” (Waldman, 2011, p. 83). If managers are 
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responding to consumer demand for investigative journalism, and if journalists are 
“rediscovering” their investigative strengths, local television newsrooms could be increasing 
their investigative productivity. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INVESTIGATIVE INFLUENCES 
 
 Berkowitz (2007) described investigative reporting as an illustration of the tension 
between different news influences, including professional values, community values, and 
business demands. One way to view these influences is through the prism of Shoemaker and 
Reese’s (2014) hierarchical model. The model describes how individual differences, professional 
routines, organizational factors, social institutions, and social systems affect news production. In 
explaining the model, the authors acknowledged that media phenomena have a variety of causes, 
and that all five levels help explain the creative process (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Their 
approach chiefly examines the interplay between structure and agency – between “the actions 
people take and the conditions under which they act that are not of their own making” 
(Shoemaker & Reese, 2014, p. 10-11). Thus, the hierarchy is useful in explaining the relative 
influence of micro- and macro-level factors. For the purposes of this project, three of the 
hierarchical levels of influence on investigative journalism will be examined – routines, 
organizations, and social institutions. It is likely that characteristics such as organizational 
emphasis on profit, ownership structure, station size, market size, and market competition affect 
the production of local television investigative news. 
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Routines 
 Most organizations want to increase income and decrease expenses — in other words, 
they want to make a profit. This leads firms to create and enforce processes, or routines, that 
make the organization more efficient. The routines of the news worker often take the form of 
unwritten rules prescribed by the organization’s work environment and culture (Shoemaker & 
Reese, 2014). Television news routines enforce efficiency to facilitate the production of quick, 
short stories (Kaniss, 1991; McManus, 1994, 2009), but these routines serve to limit time-
intensive investigative reporting. The following section looks at how the three routine stages of 
news production (discovery, selection, and reporting) affect television investigations. 
 Discovery. This is a news station’s “surveillance” activity, during which journalists 
search for story ideas. It is the most important production stage because subsequent news 
production steps can come only after an idea is discovered (McManus, 1990, 1994). It is 
especially important in investigative journalism, which provides “watchdog” surveillance of 
powerful figures. If a journalist’s search routines involve a low level of effort, surveillance of the 
environment suffers and many important stories could fall by the wayside (McManus, 1990, 
1994). 
 “Passive” discovery describes a low-effort process in which reporters search for stories 
from within the newsroom, often taking what is handed to them. This discovery method shifts 
power into the hands of those most adept at getting the media’s attention (i.e., powerful interests 
with skilled public relations departments), thus weakening the traditional media “watchdog” 
function (McManus, 1990, 1994). Conversely, “active” discoverers take more time to develop 
story sources and meet face-to-face with them outside the newsroom, attend public meetings, 
follow up with viewer tips, and generally try harder to find interesting stories (McManus, 1994). 
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Active discovery is a key component in investigative journalism because the most significant 
investigative stories are hard to find. Often, powerful people want these stories to remain hidden 
(de Burgh, 2008; Ullman & Honeyman, 1983). Therefore, discovering a worthwhile story is 
frequently the most time-consuming activity in the investigative process (Houston, 2009). 
 Unfortunately, time is often lacking in the day-to-day routines of television journalists 
(Barnhurst, 2011; Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; Kaniss, 1991; McManus, 1994). In a 
landmark study, McManus (1994) found that passive discovery dominated active discovery in 
four local television newsrooms. Both McManus (1994) and Kaniss (1991) found that much of 
the discovery power in local TV newsrooms lay in the hands of the assignment editor, who had a 
number of “go-to” passive story sources: police and fire scanners, calls to government 
departments, tips from viewers, pre-planned events, and other news media. A large portion of TV 
stories came from these passive sources, diminishing the prospect of investigative “digging,” 
although the largest station in McManus’ (1994) study had an investigative unit and was slightly 
more active than the smaller stations. Passive discovery in local television, which is still common 
(Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; Lewis, 2014), has the potential to negatively affect 
investigative journalism.  
Additionally, most TV reporters do not have assigned “beats” because television staffs 
are often smaller than their newspaper counterparts (Dunaway, 2008; Kaniss, 1991; McManus, 
1994; Waldman, 2011). Instead, most television journalists are “general assignment” reporters, 
meaning that the context, background information, and general knowledge that come with a beat 
are absent (Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; Kaniss, 1991; McManus, 1994). Because of this, 
TV reporters come up with their own story ideas less than newspaper reporters do, in many cases 
gleaning them from assignment editors (Kaniss, 1991; McManus, 1994) or other news media. 
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Coulson and Lacy (2003) found that 75% of local TV reporters said newspaper competition 
prompted them to cover city hall stories they otherwise would have missed. Because ideas for 
investigative journalism often come from beat assignments (Houston, 2009; Williams, 1978), a 
lack of beats could limit television investigations.  
 Selection. Once potential stories are uncovered, a limited number are selected for 
inclusion in a newscast. News management has a tendency to value stories with entertaining, 
visual and emotional aspects (Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; Jacobs, 1990; Kaniss, 1991; 
McManus, 1994, 2009). These elements take on even more prominence during “sweeps” ratings 
periods, when advertising prices are set for the coming fiscal quarter, and business managers are 
likelier to dictate story selection (Jacobs, 1990). Stories involving sensational elements such as 
accidents, crimes, fires, and disasters are often preferred during sweeps (Higgins-Dobney & 
Sussman, 2013). Jacobs (1990) recalls a particularly callous local television promotion of a story 
called the “Million Dollar Martini.” After a prominent actor who was drinking at a party lost two 
limbs in a subsequent motorcycle accident, there were calls for tougher penalties for anyone 
serving alcohol to a DUI motorist; the station previewed the story by saying, “serving alcohol 
can cost you an arm and a leg!” 
 Belt and Just (2008) theorized that most local TV news managers think viewers want 
low-quality, sensational, tabloid news. Visual elements take center stage in television news for 
obvious reasons, but several scholars believe that a heavy emphasis on video de-emphasizes 
important issues (Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; Kaniss, 1991; McManus, 1994). For 
instance, phone interviews are virtually off-limits, even if they are instrumental to a story, 
because they are not visually pleasing. Many suggest that television news managers emphasize 
visual and sensational stories over socially relevant stories because the former are cheaper to 
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produce and are thought to be popular (Belt & Just, 2008; Coulson et al., 2001; Hamilton, 2004; 
Kaniss, 1991; Waldman, 2011). McManus (1994) concluded that local TV news directors value 
quickly paced and highly visual newscasts because they believe viewers have short attention 
spans. This idea seems to have gained traction, with local television stories getting shorter during 
the past decade (Jurkowitz et al., 2013). Investigative reports often contain story elements that 
are seen as less entertaining, such as document analysis (Bernt & Greenwald, 2000; DeFleur, 
1997; Houston, 2009), and are lengthy, which could limit their selection potential. 
 Reporting. In addition to conducting interviews and writing a story, a television 
journalist typically must drive to a location to deliver multiple “live” reports (Barnhurst, 2011; 
Jacobs, 1990; McManus, 1994). Television reporters often write and edit stories for several 
newscasts in the same day, and because of budget cutbacks, it is increasingly common for 
reporters to shoot their own stories (Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013). In addition, broadcast 
journalists must write web versions of their stories for station websites and post links and 
previews of their stories on social media, such as Facebook and Twitter. Thus, a TV reporter’s 
particular technical and logistical duties can diminish time that might otherwise be spent on 
background activities such as source development and document analysis (Barnhurst, 2011; 
Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; Kaniss, 1991; McManus, 1994). In general, TV reporters 
appear to have less time than they once did for in-depth journalism, including investigative 
reporting (Barnhurst, 2011; Waldman, 2011).   
Many news routines are enforced by private consulting companies, which are hired by 
news organizations to help draw audiences (Berkowitz, Allen, & Beeson, 1996). Consultants are 
sometimes referred to as an “invisible tier of bosses” that journalists actually report to because 
consultants are so instrumental in news decisions (Jacobs, 1990, p. 54). They are seen as people 
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who represent business concerns and emphasize entertaining aspects such as sensationalism and 
“tabloid” news rather than more traditional journalistic content. Further, many newscasts look 
the same because stations use the same consulting companies (Jacobs, 1990; McManus, 1994). 
Consultants stress the importance of on-air personalities, who ostensibly can increase 
audience loyalty to a certain station (Jacobs, 1990; Kaniss, 1991). Thus, television managers tend 
to focus on news anchors, at the expense of local policy issues. The more a station pays its 
anchors, the less it has to pay the people who actually generate the news, such as producers, 
reporters, and assignment editors (Jacobs, 1990; Kaniss, 1991). In these situations, quality news, 
such as investigative journalism, might suffer because of an emphasis on superficial elements. 
The daily routines that are prominent in local television newsrooms can provide an 
environment in which investigative journalism is not valued (Barnhurst, 2011; Higgins-Dobney 
& Sussman, 2013; McManus, 1994, 2009). Therefore, a case could be made that news routines 
limit investigative news. However, television newsrooms are heavily influenced by 
organizational priorities, and routines often change in response to upper management pressure 
(Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). In addition, the investment necessary to conduct proper 
investigative journalism is dependent on management support. Thus, organizational structure and 
priorities appear to be more influential than routines are in the production of investigative 
journalism. 
Organizations 
 News reporters work within social structures. As these structures become more 
complicated, the reporter’s specific situational choices become less influential and the end 
product is more dependent on organizational configuration. Larger structures can be both 
constraining and enabling; thus, journalists “participate in a conversation that began before they 
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arrived” (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014, p. 11). The effects of media ownership deserve special 
attention because of increased concern about news consolidation and corporatization (Grimes, 
2014; Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; Mitchell, 2014; Smith, 2009). Despite these concerns, 
there has been little research on how media ownership affects news content (Dunaway, 2008). 
This section shows how attributes such as corporate governance and organizational emphasis on 
profit might affect television investigative journalism. 
 Profit Emphasis. The primary motive of most organizations is profit, and local TV news 
is a highly profitable business. In recent years, news organizations have faced intense pressure to 
make a profit due to the recession and an increased desire for news to be profitable (Shoemaker 
& Reese, 2014). In this environment, media managers might not see investigative reporting as a 
profitable enterprise. 
Local television news is governed by a unique economic structure. Because they compete 
in four markets simultaneously, TV stations are beholden to but also positioned to take 
advantage of their marketplace, which consists of the stock market, the source market, the 
audience market, and the advertising market (McManus, 1994). First, many news outlets are 
owned by public corporations, which are in turn owned by stockholders. Most stockholders are 
driven by the desire for profit, which weighs into news decisions (Dunaway, 2008; Hamilton, 
2004). Secondly, news organizations are in the market for sources, which exchange information 
for publicity (McManus, 1994). Third, news organizations need audiences. This means stations 
are in the market for viewers’ attention (i.e., ratings). TV stations then sell that attention in a 
fourth market, to advertisers. Local television is especially dependent on this fourth market 
because, unlike newspapers, stations do not receive fees directly from consumers. The heavy 
reliance on advertising tends to degrade news quality because sponsors desire content that will 
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garner the greatest exposure for ads, instead of content that is high in quality (McManus, 1994; 
Hamilton, 2004). If the most important criterion for news selection is popularity, citizens are 
likely to receive less information for democratic self-governance because public affairs news 
often has lower entertainment value. Thus, television’s dependence on advertisers can produce 
negative societal outcomes, such as an ill-informed electorate (McManus, 1994; Hamilton, 
2004).  
Business concerns and journalistic concerns are often seen as dueling forces within a 
news organization (see, e.g., Belt & Just, 2008, Berkowitz, 2007; Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 
2013; McManus, 1994, 2009). Most local TV network affiliates are private firms that must 
provide a return on their investments, but they also conduct business by using airwaves owned 
by the public (Hamilton, 2004; Yanich, 2012). A market-driven news model recommends 
delivering news that produces the highest possible ratings at the lowest possible cost, with the 
least amount of harm to sponsors. Alternatively, the journalistic model recommends 
disseminating the greatest amount of significant knowledge and learning possible to the most 
people, regardless of cost (Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1994). Yanich (2012) describes this 
tension as the “perennial balancing act” between what will sell and what the public needs (p. 
339).  
Several empirical studies support the idea that business concerns outweigh journalistic 
considerations at local TV stations (see, e.g., Hamilton, 2004; Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 
2013; Kaniss, 1991; McManus, 1994, 2009; Scott & Gobetz, 1992; Yanich, 2012). TV managers 
often tailor their news to a perceived audience demand for cheap content at the expense of more 
significant news. Berkowitz (1991) found that resource constraints were often the number one 
factor in local television news selection. In other words, having the resources necessary to 
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produce a story was seen as more important than whether a story was newsworthy. McManus 
(1994) showed that business concerns dominated journalistic concerns throughout the TV 
newsgathering process, and concluded that the local TV product he witnessed was not news, but 
“an illusion,” corrupted by regard for profit (p. 164). Similarly, Kaniss (1991) discovered that 
Philadelphia TV newscasts emphasized inexpensive stories with commercial appeal such as 
isolated crimes and accidents, and de-emphasized local government stories. In a national study of 
local television stories from 2002, Yanich (2012) discovered that stations overwhelmingly chose 
less expensive stories and concluded that “news selection and presentation processes have 
becoming increasingly a struggle to achieve economies of scale” (p. 340).  
There is perhaps no form of journalism as dependent on newsroom resources as is 
investigative journalism. Investigative reporters must be curious and persistent, so they need time 
to conduct their work properly, but time is not always available (Barnhurst, 2011; Higgins-
Dobney & Sussman, 2013; Houston, 2009). In general, investigative reporters spend more time 
poring over documents, meeting with sources, researching, and generally thinking about a story, 
as compared to daily journalists (de Burgh, 2008; Ettema & Glasser, 1998; Houston, 2009). 
Investigative reporter Jonathon Calvert described the time commitment this way: “some stories 
you make five calls on, some twenty. When you are making a hundred, that’s investigative 
journalism” (de Burgh, 2008, p. 17). In Houston’s (2009) The Investigative Reporter’s 
Handbook, the author mentions veteran Paul Williams’ 11 steps of investigative reporting, which 
include story conception, background research, a study of the story’s feasibility, possible legal 
hurdles, writing, re-writing, and producing follow-up stories. Properly executed investigations 
can take weeks, months, or even years (Ettema & Glasser, 1998; Houston, 2009; Ide & Vashisht, 
2006; Osnos, 2013). During this long process, investigative reporters often do not add stories to 
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the daily news cycle, limiting a firm’s daily production. Thus, reports that are truly investigative 
tend to go against the normal TV news workflow, in which reporters are expected to turn short 
stories each day (Dunaway, 2008; Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; McManus, 1994; 
Waldman, 2011). 
In addition to being a time-intensive endeavor, investigative journalism is expensive. 
Osnos (2013) reported that the online investigative news outlet ProPublica spent at least 
$750,000 and two years working on a story about the dangers of acetaminophen. Investigations 
can be costly for legal reasons as well; some stations pay lawyers to vet each investigative story 
for potential libel (Westin, 2000). Finally, investigative journalism that angers sponsors can cost 
money in lost advertising dollars; a nationwide study found that about half of local television 
news directors had been pressured by sponsors to avoid certain investigative stories (Just et al., 
2002).  
For these reasons, investigative journalism is frequently viewed as not profitable 
(Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; McManus, 1994, 2009). Raphael (2005) posits that the 
quest for profitability has caused a steady decline in investigative journalism at the network 
television level for decades. Jones (2013) found that 70% of media executives said they were 
highly committed to investigative journalism, and that it was a big part of their organizations’ 
future. But about half of the 76 executives who were polled also said their organizational leaders 
weren’t supporting investigative journalism as much as they could have. In other words, many 
news outlets had the desire to conduct investigations, but lacked the economic means to do so 
properly (Jones, 2013). Berkowitz (2007) similarly discovered that reporters at smaller 
newspapers thought economic concerns prevented them from conducting investigative 
journalism. 
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However, higher quality, expensive news has been linked to larger audiences (Belt & 
Just, 2008; Enda & Mitchell, 2013; Patterson, 2000). Newspapers that emphasize profit publish 
more investigative journalism (Beam 2003), and local TV stations that produce more 
investigative reporting get higher ratings (Belt and Just, 2008). Despite these findings, local 
television managers often think investigative reporting is not worth the investment (Belt & Just, 
2008; McManus, 1994). Investigative journalists are often the highest paid reporters in the 
newsroom, and are the first to get fired when organizations reduce their budgets (Anderson, 
2010; Graber & Dunaway, 2015; Waldman, 2011). In their ominously titled study, “The Growth 
of TV News, the Demise of the Journalism Profession,” Higgins-Dobney and Sussman (2013) 
concluded that most TV reporters have little time for investigative reporting because profit-
minded news organizations have severely cut back on station resources. Veteran news executive 
Fred Young said local television investigative units are not financially feasible: “investigative 
people, in the eyes of some of the people who looked at the bottom line of (certain) stations, 
were not as productive as the reporters turning a story a day. Investigative has suffered” 
(Waldman, 2011, p. 87). Based on the preceding literature, it seems likely that a local television 
station that places a high emphasis on profit will not highly emphasize investigative reporting. 
 Corporate Governance Influence. Ownership structure can influence the goals and 
daily operations of organizations (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Because shareholders, who own 
publicly traded corporations, have limited ability to interfere with the day-to-day management of 
the firm, there is a separation between ownership and control (Barney & Hesterly, 2006; Scott & 
Davis, 2007). Absent any other preferences, profit is assumed to be the unifying goal of diverse 
shareholders within one company. Therefore, news critics often assume that publicly traded news 
organizations place profit above all else, and that a private owner can more easily affect the day-
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to-day news operation of the firm (Dunaway, 2008, 2013; Hamilton, 2004). Compared to 
corporate bosses, private news owners are viewed as more likely having journalistic goals that 
compete with economic goals (Bagdikian, 2004; Baker, 2007; Dunaway, 2008, 2013). Hamilton 
(2004) assumed profit maximization was the primary motive of local television news outlets 
because of widespread corporate ownership, which has increased in recent years (Matsa, 2015; 
Mitchell, 2014).  
 According to what Demers (1996) called the “critical model,” corporate owners, who do 
not live near their news outlets, will replace valuable local reporting with cheaper news that is of 
lower quality and is less useful to the public (Bagdikian, 2004; Baker, 2007; Higgins-Dobney & 
Sussman, 2013; Meyer, 2009; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Critics fear public corporations might 
also tamp down views that are critical of business for fear of alienating sponsors (Bagdikian, 
2004; Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1994, 2009). Brant Houston (2006), speaking about a decline 
in investigative journalism, said, “When it comes to quality public service journalism or profits 
at a corporation, profits come first” (p. 4).  
Several studies support the critical model. Corporate ownership has been associated with 
smaller news staffs (Baker, 2007; Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; Lacy & Blanchard, 2003), 
which can in turn decrease news quality (Beam, 2008; McManus, 1994). Dunaway (2008) found 
evidence that corporations limit public affairs reporting at the local level. In a study of political 
coverage in two markets, corporate-owned local TV stations and newspapers were significantly 
less likely to cover relevant political issues useful to the public, when compared to privately 
owned news outlets. Scott, Gobetz, and Chanslor (2008) concluded that a Tulsa television station 
owned by a public corporation produced less local news, less local video, and fewer stories 
featuring local reporters, compared to a small, privately-owned station in the same market. These 
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analyses suggest that public corporations hurt journalism quality. If this is the case, corporations 
might also limit investigative reporting, which is generally seen as high quality (Aucoin, 1997; 
Berkowitz, 2007). 
However, other research suggests corporations might have a positive effect on journalism 
quality. Demers (1996) pointed out that corporate news outlets are often located in complex 
communities with greater diversity, and thus they are more critical of established groups and 
elites. According to Demers (1996), the very nature of the corporate structure that is supposed to 
harm local news is actually a benefit. With news corporation heads far from the newsroom, 
middle-management news directors and editors are freer to conduct time-intensive, quality news 
without being watched closely by an executive. Thus, they have more editorial freedom to 
produce substantive local news and challenge the status quo (Demers, 1996; Kim, 2009), as 
investigative journalism often does. 
The journalistic benefits of decentralization are supported by the bureaucracy theory of 
organizations. As firms get bigger, power and decision-making become decentralized. This gives 
more power to middle managers (e.g., TV news directors) to conduct business as they see fit 
(Donaldson, 2001). Thus, larger, often publicly traded, corporations might actually provide news 
editors with more autonomy. Kaniss (1991) maintains that local television advertisers hold more 
sway over local news owners, as opposed to non-local owners. Non-local corporate owners 
would theoretically be more isolated from the influence of local advertisers, and therefore freer 
to allow a station to conduct public service journalism with less commercial interference. 
Proponents of bureaucracy theory also predict that increased organizational size leads to 
increasing specialization at lower levels (Donaldson, 2001). In television news, this 
specialization could take the form of investigative news teams. If ownership by shareholders 
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provides for more journalistic freedom and more specialization, investigative reporting at local 
TV stations owned by publicly traded corporations could benefit.  
Several studies show a link between corporate governance and higher-quality journalism 
(see, e.g., Akhavan-Majid & Boudreau, 1995; Akhavan-Majid, Rife, & Gopinath, 1991; Demers, 
1996, 1998; Kim, 2009). Publicly traded corporations that own news properties often own 
multiple local stations, and Hamilton (2004) found that group TV ownership was associated with 
increased local mayoral coverage. On the print side, newspapers that exhibit more “corporate” 
characteristics often are more critical of government and power structures, publish more local 
content, and emphasize quality journalism more than profit (Demers, 1996, 1998; Kim, 2009). 
Beam (2008) reported that newspapers owned by publicly traded corporations covered local civic 
stories slightly more than privately owned newspapers did, and Donohue, Olien, and Tichenor 
(1989) found that corporate newspaper ownership did not increase advertising pressure at the 
expense of news.  
 Kim (2009) suggested that the growth of corporate media in the 20th century helped 
create social change by fostering a news environment that challenged the status quo. If this is 
true, corporate ownership may promote the kind of investigative journalism that challenges those 
in power. Publicly owned newspapers are less likely to be neutral in tone (Dunaway, 2013), and 
more likely to contain critical, activist, analytical, and investigative reporting, compared to 
privately owned newspapers (Akhavan-Majid & Boudreau, 1995; Akhavan-Majid, Rife, & 
Gopinath, 1991; Demers, 1996, 1998; Kim, 2009). Akhavan-Majid and Boudreau (1995) 
reported that large group-owned newspapers were associated with a more interpretive and critical 
role for journalists, compared to independent newspapers. Further, journalists who work for large 
corporations tend to be more satisfied with their jobs (Weaver et al., 2007), and satisfaction 
 32
levels are higher if reporters believe their organizations place a high emphasis on journalism 
(Beam, 2006; Stamm & Underwood, 1993; Weaver, Beam, Brownlee, Voakes, & Wilhoit, 
2007). Therefore, television stations owned by publicly traded companies might be placing a 
higher value on critical, investigative reporting. 
 Although there is evidence that corporations are hurting news quality because of a higher 
emphasis on profit, there is also evidence that corporations help create a news environment in 
which journalists are freer to pursue critical and investigative reporting. Thus, investigative 
journalism might be particularly suited to the corporate news environment. 
Social Institutions 
The social institutional perspective focuses on how media are affected by institutional 
power centers in society, and sees journalism largely as a homogenous social practice in which 
news outlets have similar concerns about legitimacy and commercial success (Shoemaker and 
Reese, 2014). Within this realm, competitive factors in television markets are likely to influence 
the quantity and quality of investigative journalism that is produced. 
 Television Markets and Competition. The characteristics of a news market, including 
market size and competition level, can shape news content (see, e.g., Coulson & Lacy, 2003; 
Dunaway, 2008, 2013; Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1994; Powers, 1993; Wang, 2012). U.S. local 
television markets are unique because they have traditionally functioned as oligopolies – they 
have had a low number of competitors, high barriers to entry, stable market shares, and easily 
achievable price coordination (Litman, 1980; Powers, 1990, 2001). The main barrier to entry is 
the granting of exclusive and mandatory FCC licenses, which are high in demand and low in 
supply (“How to Apply,” 2013). The FCC grants licenses to only one affiliate for each network 
(e.g., NBC or CBS) per market, so the number of competitors is limited. TV news ratings in local 
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markets often do not fluctuate rapidly, making market shares fairly stable. Finally, with a small 
number of competitors, firms can agree on a general fee for TV advertising, and price 
coordination is easily achieved (Litman, 1980; Powers, 1990). 
But starting in the 1980s, competition changed the oligopolistic nature of local television 
markets (Powers, 1990; 1993; 2001). According to microeconomic theory, competition causes an 
oligopoly to move closer to a state of monopolistic competition, in which there are a large 
number of sellers with differentiated products (Nicholson 1979; Powers, 1990). Thirty years ago, 
the popularity of the VCR and cable news channels gave local TV viewers more choices and 
weakened the traditional oligopolistic structure (Powers, 1990). More recently, the Internet has 
caused an explosion of video alternatives for consumers, so it is likely that media competition in 
local markets is currently at an all-time high (Jurkowitz, 2014; Powers, 2001; Waldman, 2011).  
Local television competition has been linked to improved news quality and quantity (see, 
e.g., Belt & Just, 2008; Napoli & Yan, 2007; Yan & Napoli, 2006). Yan and Napoli (2006) 
examined on-air content in 2003 from a random sample of 285 U.S. local television stations and 
concluded that as the number of stations in a local TV market increased, there was an increased 
likelihood that a station would provide quality local public affairs programming. However, there 
was no connection between competition and the amount of quality public affairs programming at 
each station. Using the same data set, Napoli and Yan (2007) found a connection between the 
number of commercial TV stations in a market and the amount of local news produced, 
ascertaining that each additional commercial station in a market translated into an average of 1.3 
more hours of local news for each station in the market. In a comprehensive five-year national 
study of local television content, Belt and Just (2008) showed that stations in more competitive 
markets produced higher-quality lead stories, although competition did not affect overall story 
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quality. Competition has also been shown to increase news budgets (Coulson & Lacy, 2003), 
which could theoretically lead to improved quality if that money is spent on personnel. However, 
Powers (1990) found that competition did not lead to larger news staffs. 
Powers (1990, 1993, 2001) showed that local TV competition was associated with 
newscast differentiation – newscasts became longer, stories became longer, and more newscasts 
were implemented, especially in larger markets. It is possible that in a competitive market, 
stations might look to differentiate themselves by producing longer, unique, “exclusive” 
investigative pieces. If competition increases the amount of local news, the quality of news, the 
length of stories, and news budgets, then competitive markets might allow for more and better 
investigative stories, which tend to be longer, more expensive, and of higher quality. 
 In contrast, Dominick and Moffett (1993) found that competition caused national TV 
news networks to become standardized, instead of differentiated. Entman (1985) studied a 
sample of newspapers and found that competition created more similarity, and did not create a 
diversity of ideas as expected. Other studies of various media markets suggest competition serves 
to lower news quality and increase sensationalism (Arnold, 2004; Dunaway, 2008; Entman, 
1985; Wang, 2012; Zaller, 1999). The pressure to expand audiences may cause news outlets to 
produce popular fare that lacks substance (Dunaway, 2013; McManus, 1994, 2009). According 
to Arnold (2004), “fires, protests and car chases appear to be the comparative advantage of local 
TV stations that prefer great visuals to (talking) heads” (p. 220). Zaller (1999) discovered that as 
local television competition increased over time, quality decreased. Hamilton (2004) believes 
that television news competition creates a “race to the bottom,” in which all competitors in a 
single market decrease news quality to appeal to more viewers (p. 22). In his spatial model of 
news production location, Hamilton (2004) speculated that as more competitors enter a TV 
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market, news outlets “position” themselves to serve the most possible consumers. Because more 
viewers prefer soft news to hard news, and because advertisers prefer soft news (Hamilton, 2004; 
McManus, 1994, 2009), TV stations will meet this demand by producing more soft news. Thus, 
according to Hamilton (2004), smaller audiences that prefer public affairs reporting will not be 
served in a competitive market. This reduces the amount of relevant public affairs information 
available to citizens. But Hamilton’s (2004) spatial model received only minimal support in his 
analysis of newscasts in the top 50 local TV markets; stations in more competitive markets 
produced more soft news, but also produced more hard news, including more stories about state 
and local officials. Therefore, competition was associated with higher-quality local hard news, 
but increased the overall story count, likely causing stations to run shorter stories on average 
(Hamilton, 2004). If competition lowers quality, as some suggest, then competitive markets may 
restrict investigative production. 
 Institutionalism and Investigative Journalism. The institutionalist theory of 
organizations has been used to explain how news outlets behave in competitive environments 
(Lowrey, 2005; Lowrey & Woo, 2010). Institutionalism emphasizes that an organization’s 
environment limits the strategic choices managers can make, and focuses on the power of 
symbolic environmental forces, including shared values, beliefs, norms, and rules (Scott, 2014; 
Scott & Davis, 2007). 
 In uncertain environments, such as a highly competitive media market, an accurate 
rational assessment of the environment becomes more difficult, so firms make decisions based 
on perceptions of their competitive environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Lowrey, 2005). 
These decisions often are made to improve a firm’s legitimacy, rather than efficiency (DiMaggio 
 36
& Powell, 1983; Lowrey, 2005; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2014). According to Scott (2014), 
legitimacy is like “oxygen” for an organization: it is necessary for social survival (p. 72). 
 Even though local television is the top news source in America (Lewis, 2014; “Local 
News Interest,” 2015; Mitchell, 2014), the TV news business as a whole is uncertain because 
Internet sources have taken away market shares from television stations, and young adults are 
increasingly turning away from television news (“In Changing News”, 2012; Jurkowitz, 2014; 
Lowrey & Woo, 2010; Potter, Matsa, & Mitchell, 2013). Highly competitive news markets add 
to this environmental uncertainty (Lowrey & Woo, 2010). Because organizations are more likely 
to seek legitimacy in unstable environments, TV stations in competitive markets may seek 
legitimacy through increased production of investigative journalism. 
 An organization in an unstable environment is more likely to become “loosely coupled,” 
allowing for gaps between formal work structures and actual work practices (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977, p. 341). These gaps can detract from an organization’s efficiency, but may improve 
credibility, allowing a firm to maintain access to needed resources that enhance survival 
prospects. Loose coupling takes focus away from the end result and allows a company to focus 
more on ambiguous goals (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). For instance, a hospital might ignore data on 
how many patients it cures, focusing instead on how many patients it treats. Likewise, a 
television station in a competitive market might focus less on the economic efficiency of its 
reports, and more on simply churning out investigative stories that increase legitimacy. 
 Investigative reporting potentially decreases short-term efficiency due to its expense 
(Anderson, 2010; Osnos, 2013), yet it is seen as a high-quality news product (Berkowitz, 2007; 
Curtin, 1995). It is perceived as having a positive impact on society and democracy (Berkowitz, 
2007; Blasi, 1977; Protess et al., 1991), and is popular among consumers (Jones, 2013; Rowe, 
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2011). Graber and Dunaway (2015) argue that investigative pieces have the potential to achieve 
three major news objectives: they appeal to audiences, they trigger political action, and they gain 
praise from fellow journalists. From an institutionalist standpoint, firms that are more in sync 
with their institutional environments become more dependent on outside assessments of their 
credibility (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). One form of assessment in journalism is awards, which 
often go to investigative stories (Downie, 2012). Many TV stations tout the awards they have 
won, so it is likely that news managers desire the credibility that comes from award-winning 
investigative pieces. 
 Investigative stories are also “exclusives,” meaning that no other outlet has the same 
story. Exclusives provide competitive value, meaning that they make the reporting outlet look 
reputable in comparison to competitors (McManus, 1994). Stations can thus use teams of 
investigative reporters as branding tools, helping viewers associate investigative reporters with 
station quality. From an economic perspective, news is a “credence good,” meaning that 
consumers cannot easily decipher the value of the product and must rely on reputation 
(McManus, 1994). Therefore, the branding associated with investigative journalism could be 
crucial in helping consumers assess news quality. Indeed, Waldman (2011) reported that, despite 
recent cutbacks, several stations preserved their investigative teams because investigative news 
was “important to their brand” (p. 83). Further, Meyer and Rowan (1977) pointed out that in 
highly institutionalized environments, business leaders devote more time to their organizations’ 
images.  
 Competition might also cause a television station to brand a story as “investigative,” even 
if it is not truly investigative by definition. Organizations in uncertain situations become 
“isomorphic” with their institutional environments, modeling themselves after firms that appear 
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legitimate, professional, and successful (Lowrey, 2005; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For 
example, news outlets in competitive situations have been found to imitate credible journalism 
organizations (Lowrey, 2005; Lowrey & Woo, 2010). Lowrey (2005) discovered that news 
managers pursued partnerships between newspapers and television stations not because there 
was a need for it, but because credible rival organizations were doing it. Lowrey and Woo (2010) 
showed that competition predicted imitation of online news content; rather than responding to 
audience demand, newspaper managers in competitive markets sought to improve their online 
legitimacy through mimicry of other papers’ websites. In the same way, television news mimicry 
could take the form of reports that at first appear investigative, and are promoted as such, but do 
not meet the high standard required for these types of stories. 
 Media critics have pointed out the overall proliferation of “fluff,” or “soft,” investigative 
pieces on television, a medium that generally has a weaker reputation for investigative and 
public affairs news compared to print sources (Kaniss, 1991; Kovach et al., 2001; McManus, 
1994; Waldman, 2011). In a national sample, Just et al. (2002) found that about one-third of local 
TV stations were producing stories on “soft” investigative topics such as illegal silicone 
injections at parties and dangerous garage doors. Waldman (2011) highlighted the widespread 
practice of local television stations applying the “investigative” label on “increasingly frivolous 
exposes” (p. 87). Higgins-Dobney and Sussman (2013) found that at some local television 
outlets, journalists defined investigative reporting as “taking more than an hour to investigate 
something” (p. 857). 
 An example of “soft” investigative news came from Cleveland CBS affiliate WOIO this 
year when a reporter “investigated” the validity of expiration dates by tasting expired food on the 
air. In another example, Denver station KMGH last year “investigated” the dangers of edible 
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marijuana by asking children if they could tell the difference between pot brownies and regular 
brownies (Marchetta & Shelley, 2014). Veteran television investigative reporter Joe Bergantino 
said superficial investigations such as these have hurt the practice’s reputation (Waldman, 2011). 
“They are using ‘investigative reporting’ more as a label rather than a real thing,” Bergantino 
said. “The trend is that stations call promotable stories ‘investigative,’ while shrinking or 
disbanding their investigative units. Serious, in-depth investigative reporting happens on rare 
occasions in local television news” (Waldman, 2011, p. 87-88). These “fluff” investigations 
might improve a station’s credibility with audiences because reporters appear to be working hard 
to uncover the truth. Although the subject material may be superficial and not truly investigative, 
consumers often cannot tell the difference between high-quality and low-quality news 
(McManus, 1994). Therefore, news managers could believe that these stories will transmit an 
“air of legitimacy.” 
 In summary, there is evidence suggesting that competition lowers news quality because 
managers will respond by increasing production of popular content that is often superficial. 
Conversely, competition has been shown to increase news quality and news differentiation. 
Further, competitive environments increase the need for legitimacy, which can be satisfied by 
investigative journalism. For these reasons, television station managers in markets with high 
levels of competition might increase their investigative productivity, but might also increase the 
production of investigative news that is lower in quality. 
 Measuring Competition. Lacy and Vermeer (1995) called news competition a “complex 
concept,” and held that some measures of competition are more appropriate than others 
depending on the situation (p. 58). Compared to newspaper competition, television news 
competition is harder to measure because local TV markets are more complicated and often have 
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a greater number of sellers. Television news competition is likely even more complex in today’s 
media environment due to Internet news choices (Jurkowitz, 2014; Lowrey & Woo, 2010) and an 
increasing number of news-producing stations (Papper, 2014a). 
 The two most oft-used competition measures for local TV are the number of stations in a 
market (see, e.g., Hamilton, 2004; Napoli & Yan, 2007; Yan & Napoli, 2006) and similarity in 
market share among competitors (see, e.g., Dominick & Moffett, 1993; Powers, 1990, 2001). 
Using the number of stations in a market as an operationalization of competition has several 
advantages: it is simple and obtainable, it accounts for differences in the number of firms within 
a market, and it is preferable to nominal measures of competition (Lacy & Vermeer, 1995). On 
the other hand, it treats all firms equally, failing to distinguish between stations that compete for 
news audiences and stations that do not. Further, it does not account for the fact that some 
stations have larger market shares than others. In a meta-analysis of competition measurement, 
Lacy and Vermeer (1995) found that the number of stations in a market did not correlate well 
with other competition measures, such as those that measured market share. Thus, the number of 
stations measure may not be appropriate for some studies. Nonetheless, this measure has been 
used extensively as a proxy for television competition, especially in more recent studies (see, 
e.g., Hamilton, 2004; Napoli & Yan, 2007; Wang, 2012; Yan & Napoli, 2006). In her study of 
political coverage, Dunaway (2008) used a combined measure of competition that accounted for 
the number of television stations in a market and potential television households in each market. 
 Alternatively, researchers have measured competition through market share similarity 
among competitors (Belt & Just, 2008; Dominick & Moffett, 1993; Lacy, Atwater, & Qin, 1989; 
Powers, 1990; 1993; 2001). This “competition index,” or “competition intensity” measure, is 
calculated by subtracting a particular station’s share of viewers (often represented by Nielsen 
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shares) from the leading competitor’s share: 0 would represent a station’s perfect competition 
with the leading firm, and 100 would represent a complete lack of competition with the leading 
firm (Lacy & Vermeer, 1995; Powers, 1993). For example, if a station’s market share were 30, 
compared to a share of 50 for the leading competitor, that station’s competition index number 
would be 20. Belt and Just (2008) used a similar concept that measured the standard deviation of 
market shares for all stations in the market; in their study, a lower standard deviation indicated a 
more competitive market. 
 Measuring market share similarities has several benefits: it uses interval data, and it takes 
into account a manager’s perspective, i.e., how managers might respond to the level of 
competition they are facing (Lacy & Vermeer, 1995). However, there are several disadvantages. 
One drawback is that the competition index might not work well in markets with three or more 
competitors, which is very common in local TV. Additionally, similar market share does not 
necessarily mean that the products produced by two stations are similar (Lacy & Vermeer, 1995). 
Finally, recent Nielsen ratings for local TV stations are expensive and difficult to obtain. 
 Because of the relative advantages detailed the preceding literature, the current project 
will use the number of commercial stations in a television market to measure competition. 
 Station Size. The size of a local television news station has been measured by the 
number of newsroom employees (see, e.g., Baker, 2007; Dunaway, 2008; Lacy & Blanchard, 
2003), but is more often measured by the size of the market in which it is located (see, e.g., 
Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1994; Powers, 1990, 2001). Market size has been shown to play a 
part in the amount of hard news produced (Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1994; Yanich, 2012) and 
the amount of local news produced (Carroll, 1985; 1989; Coulson et al., 2001; Lacy et al., 2008). 
Therefore, because investigative journalism is typically hard news (de Burgh, 2008; Gaber, 
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2008), and because news investigations at local stations mostly focus on local events, the size of 
a television station could relate to the amount and type of investigative reporting produced. 
 Many studies found that smaller television markets produced more hard news, along with 
more local news (see, e.g., Carroll, 1985; 1989; Coulson et al., 2001; Hamilton, 2004; Yanich, 
2012). Carroll (1989) found that enterprise stories in small markets were more likely to feature 
hard news elements, and thus were more “legitimately enterprising,” compared to enterprise 
stories in medium and large television markets (p. 56). Hamilton (2004) found that at local TV 
stations, national news and local hard news both decreased significantly as market size increased. 
Yanich (2012) analyzed local televsion content from 2002 and found that larger stations focused 
less on local government and politics, and more on crime. Smaller market stations also placed 
more emphasis on public interest issues such as health, education, housing and the economy. 
Other studies, however, found that local television market size had little or no effect on news 
quality (Belt & Just, 2008; Reinardy & Bacon, 2014). McManus (1994) postulated that TV news 
stations in large markets produce more hard news because consumer demand is great enough to 
make it marketable to advertisers. In other words, good journalism “pays” in big markets. 
McManus (1990, 1994) found that reporters at larger local TV stations were more enterprising 
and produced more investigative journalism. 
News quality has been positively linked to the number of journalists employed in several 
studies (see, e.g., Baker, 2007; Dunaway, 2008; Lacy & Blanchard, 2003). Weaver et al. (2007) 
concluded that journalists at larger organizations are more comfortable espousing a “watchdog” 
attitude because of the relative safety of these outlets. Larger news operations can ostensibly 
insulate reporters from harm, including lawsuits, because of greater resources. In a similar vein, 
Gade (2008) showed that newspaper size was positively correlated with an editor’s perceived 
 43
influence within the organization. Editors at larger papers have been shown to place higher value 
on “editorial courage,” “editorial independence,” “staff enterprise,” and “news interpretation” 
(Gladney, 1990, p. 67-68), all of which can be components of investigative journalism. Akhavan-
Majid and Boudreau (1995) discovered that editors of larger newspapers were significantly more 
likely to subscribe to “activist” editorial values, emphasizing an “active, interpretive, 
investigative, and critical role for the press” (p. 864). Berkowitz (2007) found that reporters at 
small newspapers were less likely to conduct investigative journalism because of newsroom 
cultures, economic pressure and community orientation. The preceding literature suggests that 
news organizations with bigger staffs in bigger markets emphasize investigative reporting more 
than organizations with smaller news staffs in smaller markets. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 Literature indicates an overall decrease in local television investigative journalism in 
recent years (Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; Jessell, 2012), but investigative reporting is 
highly valued by reporters (Willnat & Weaver, 2014), news managers, and news consumers 
(Jones, 2013). Absent directional hypotheses, the following research questions are proposed 
regarding investigative quantity and quality: 
 
RQ1: Based on a content analysis of local television newscasts, how much investigative 
journalism is being done? 
RQ2: Based on a content analysis of local television newscasts, what is the overall quality of the 
investigative journalism being done? 
 
Conventional wisdom and empirical studies suggest that a news organization that 
emphasizes profit will provide less support for investigative journalism, which is often seen as 
financially inefficient (Graber & Dunaway, 2015; Osnos, 2013; Waldman, 2011). Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
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H1: Taking other ownership and market variables into account, a television station’s perceived 
profit emphasis will negatively predict that station’s investigative: (a) quantity, (b) quality, and 
(c) emphasis.  
 
 Several studies show a link between staff size and quality (Dunaway, 2008; Lacy & 
Blanchard, 2003). Because investigative journalism is seen as a high-quality product (Berkowitz, 
2007; Curtin, 1995), and because larger news organizations are often more critical and 
investigative (Akhavan-Majid & Boudreau, 1995; Gladney, 1990), size should relate positively 
to investigative production. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H2: Taking other ownership and market variables into account, a television station’s newsroom 
staff size will positively predict that station’s investigative: (a) quantity, (b) quality, and (c) 
emphasis. 
 
 Although some literature suggests that stations in smaller markets produce more hard 
news (Hamilton, 2004; Yanich, 2012), investigative news, which can be critical of those in 
power, appears to have more of a home in larger markets, where news managers often have more 
editorial independence and are more critical (Akhavan-Majid and Boudreau, 1995; Berkowitz, 
2007; Gade, 2008; Weaver et al., 2007). Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H3: Taking other ownership and market variables into account, the size of the market in which a 
television station is located will positively predict that station’s investigative: (a) quantity, (b) 
quality, and (c) emphasis. 
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 Some research suggests that competition decreases news quality (Dunaway, 2008; 
Hamilton, 2004). However, scholars have shown that competition is also related to improved 
story quality, newscast differentiation, and larger news budgets (Lacy & Coulson, 2003; Powers, 
1990, 2001), all of which can be conducive to investigative journalism. Although it might not 
increase efficiency, investigative journalism can help a station’s image through awards, a 
recognizable brand, and the appearance of legitimacy, which is crucial to organizational survival 
in uncertain environments brought on by increased competition (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H4: Taking other ownership and market variables into account, the competition level of the 
market in which a television station is located will positively predict that station’s investigative: 
(a) quantity, (b) quality, and (c) emphasis. 
 
 Several studies suggest that news outlets owned by publicly traded corporations are 
associated with lower news quality (Dunaway, 2008; Scott et al., 2008), but other research 
indicates that journalists who work for corporations are allowed to be more investigative, critical, 
and analytical in their work (Akhavan-Majid & Boudreau, 1995; Demers, 1996, 1998; Kim, 
2009). Because investigative reporting is often critical and analytical, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
 
H5: Taking other ownership and market variables into account, a station’s ownership status as a 
publicly traded company will positively predict that station’s investigative: (a) quantity, (b) 
quality, and (c) emphasis. 
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 To determine which factor has the greatest influence on investigative productivity, the 
following research question is proposed: 
 
RQ3: Of the five ownership and market variables (profit emphasis, ownership by a publicly 
traded company, newsroom staff size, market size, and competition level), which is the strongest 
predictor of a station’s investigative: (a) quantity, (b) quality, and (c) emphasis? 
 
 Competition encourages news managers to copy their rivals in a quest for legitimacy 
(Lowrey, 2005; Lowrey & Woo, 2010). Because investigative journalism is seen as a high-
quality news product (Berkowitz, 2007), managers in a competitive environment might brand 
stories as “investigative” to appear legitimate, even if the stories are not investigative by 
traditional definition. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H6: The proportion of a station’s branded investigative stories that are “non-investigative” will 
increase as the market in which that station is located becomes more competitive. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
METHODS 
 
 To explore the project’s research questions and hypotheses, several methods of inquiry 
were used. First, a survey of investigative television journalists was designed to measure 
individual perceptions of investigative work at local television stations across the country. 
Second, a content analysis was designed to measure the actual investigative content produced by 
those stations. Third, secondary data regarding the organizational structure of television news 
outfits and their markets were gathered to explore connections between these factors and 
investigative productivity. A triangulation of multiple research methods is often appropriate for 
large-scale assessments such as this one because each method has strengths and weaknesses, and 
data from each method reflect the particular method of inquiry (Baxter & Babbie, 2004). In the 
following section, the study designs of the survey and content analysis data collection phases are 
described, followed by discussion of the variables measured in each. Finally, organizational and 
market data are described. 
Survey 
 Assessing journalists’ perceptions of their work environment and their work activity can 
be an effective way to measure newsroom trends, including the amount and quality of the news 
journalists produce (Coulson et al., 2001). To establish a sampling frame for this project’s 
survey, two affiliates from the four major networks (NBC, CBS, ABC, Fox) were randomly 
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selected from each of the 210 U.S. local TV markets, allowing for greater representation of the 
industry as a whole (Coulson et al., 2001). Stations were chosen from the Complete Television, 
Radio & Cable Industry Directory (2014) and then cross-referenced with individual station 
websites and TVJobs.com. Calls to station employees confirmed the presence of a newsroom. If 
a selected affiliate did not have an active newsroom, the next station in the pre-determined order 
of affiliates was selected. If a television market contained only one active newsroom, that station 
was automatically selected. This process yielded 397 stations. As a point of comparison, last year 
719 U.S. stations produced original local news (Papper, 2014a). Phone calls generated the name 
of the lead investigative reporter at each station, who then became the target of the survey.  
Stations without investigative reporters were excluded from the study. 
The final sample thus consisted of the names of 253 investigative journalists, each at a 
different station. In fall 2013 and winter 2014, a four-contact mail survey was employed as 
recommended by Dillman, Christian, and Smyth (2009): a paper questionnaire was mailed to 
reporters’ television stations, followed by a postcard, a replacement questionnaire, and a 
reminder phone call. A total of 165 questionnaires were returned for a 65% response rate. All 
respondents confirmed on the questionnaires that at least “some” of their reporting was 
investigative. Phone calls to individual stations determined that 66% of respondents in the final 
sample were full-time investigative reporters. The remaining 34% were general assignment 
reporters who were the most likely to produce investigative stories. Nearly a third of the stations 
in the final sample (30.3%) had two or more full-time investigative reporters, more than a third 
(35.8%) had one full-time investigative reporter; and the remaining third (33.9%) had zero full-
time investigative reporters (M=1.21; SD=1.25). In terms of affiliation, 49 respondents worked 
for NBC stations, 49 for ABC stations, 50 for CBS stations, and 26 for Fox stations (the affiliate 
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total was greater than 165 because several respondents’ newsrooms provided newscasts for 
multiple affiliates).  
The survey questionnaire contained a number of Likert-style items (e.g., 1=Strongly 
Disagree, 5=Strongly agree) and open-ended questions. The questions sought information about 
respondents’ perceptions of investigative work at their stations, their work environment, 
characteristics of their organizations, and demographics. Some items were modified from 
previous studies to fit the present survey (Beam, 2006; Coulson et al., 2001; Protess et al., 1991). 
The sampling error for this survey, calculated at a 95% level of confidence with 165 respondents 
and a .25 level of variation, was +/- 7.6%. See Appendix A for the full questionnaire. 
 More than a third (36%) of respondents were female, a proportion similar to that found in 
Willnat and Weaver’s (2014) national survey of journalists, and 15% were non-white, nearly 
double the minority proportion among all U.S. news media (8.5%). However, higher 
representation of minority reporters is typical in television (Willnat & Weaver, 2014). Tenure as 
an investigative reporter averaged 9.61 years (SD=8.77), and the mean age was 40.11 
(SD=12.41), seven years younger than the average age for journalists in all media (Willnat & 
Weaver, 2014). The median yearly salary was between $60,000 and $74,999. 
Survey Measures 
Of the interval-level survey measures listed below, all but one had 1% or fewer missing 
values; one variable had 4% missing values. Linear interpolation in SPSS was used to address 
missing data. This method uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to predict missing values 
and impute them; the last valid value before the missing value and the first valid value after the 
missing value are used for the interpolation (“Estimation Methods,” 2013). Linear interpolation 
is often seen as preferable to other options, including mean imputation (“Replace Missing 
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Values,” 2014). An alternative method, pairwise deletion, was not used to address missing values 
because it can introduce bias and can reduce comparability between variables (Bethlehem, 
Cobben, & Schouten, 2011; Newman & Cottrell, 2015). 
The following measures were from the investigative journalist questionnaire: 
 Profit Emphasis. Respondents were asked their level of agreement (1=Strongly 
Disagree, 5=Strongly Agree) with the statement, “My news organization places a great deal of 
importance on earning high, above-average profits” (M=3.80, SD=1.09). 
 Staff Size. Respondents were asked to write down how many “full-time news 
employees” worked at their stations (M=53.60, SD=39.54). The largest reported news staff was 
at KPNX in Phoenix, AZ (300 employees); the smallest was at KXGN in Glendive, MT (1 
employee). 
 Investigative Emphasis. Respondents indicated the perceived level of investigative 
productivity at their stations by answering a number of survey items. Thirteen survey items, 
along with one item gathered through phone conversations with station managers, were used to 
measure how much a station emphasized investigative reporting. Eleven survey items asked 
respondents’ level of agreement (1=Strongly Disagree, 5=Strongly Agree) with the following 
statements: 
 
“During the past year or so, the quality of investigative news at my station has improved.” 
“During the past year or so, the amount of time I spend on investigative journalism, in 
comparison to other news stories, has increased.” 
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“During the past year or so, airtime devoted to investigative news at my station has increased.” 
“During the past year or so, the number of investigative projects I’ve worked on that took longer 
than two months to prepare has increased.” 
“During the past year or so, the total number of staff members at my station assigned to work on 
investigative projects has increased.” 
“Reporters at my station are given adequate time to cover investigative news stories.” 
“My station routinely allows air time for thorough investigative news coverage.” 
“Reporters in my newsroom think investigative reporting is the most important assignment at my 
station.” 
“My news director thinks investigative reporting is the most important assignment at my 
station.” 
“Investigative news routinely is given prominent air time at my station.” 
“I spend most of my time working on investigative reports, in comparison to other forms of 
journalism.” 
 
 Of the remaining three items, one survey question asked how the amount of investigative 
news at a respondent’s station had been trending in the past year or so (1=Significantly 
Decreased, 5=Significantly Increased), and another asked respondents how much of their work 
over the past year or so had been investigative (1=None of My Reporting is Investigative, 5=All 
of My Reporting is Investigative). The final item, gathered through phone calls, measured the 
number of full-time investigative reporters at each station. 
 A factor analysis was used to determine underlying dimensions of and variation among 
the 14 variables (DeVellis, 2012). Because it was desirable to reduce these variables into one 
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measure representing a station’s perceived investigative “emphasis,” a principal component 
analysis (PCA) was used with Varimax rotation for interpretation. PCA is helpful in eliminating 
statistical redundancy (Kambhatla & Leen, 1997), and PCA with Varimax rotation is appropriate 
for analyzing exploratory variables, such as those in the present project (Dess & Beard, 1984).  
Table 1 shows that the 14 measures revealed three different dimensions of investigative 
productivity. Eight survey items (overall investigative increase at respondents’ stations in the 
past year, “The quality of investigative news at my station has improved,” “The amount of time I 
spend on investigative journalism has increased,” “Airtime devoted to investigative news at my 
station has increased,” “The number of investigative projects I’ve worked on that took longer 
than two months has increased,” “The number of investigative staff members at my station has 
increased,” “Reporters at my station are given adequate time to cover investigative news stories,” 
and “My station allows air time for thorough investigative news coverage”) loaded onto the first 
dimension and explained the highest proportion of the variation (32.7%). This factor was called 
“Investigative Emphasis.” Although two variables in the first factor (“Airtime increased,” 
“Station allows time for thorough coverage”) were somewhat correlated with those in the second 
factor, the highest loadings for these two measures were in Factor 1, and thus for the purposes of 
this project they were retained in the first factor. 
Three survey items (“Reporters think investigative reporting is important,” “News 
directors think investigative reporting is important,” and “Investigative news is given prominent 
airtime”) loaded onto the second factor and explained 18.5% of the variation. This dimension 
was called “Investigative Awareness.” Three items (“I spend most of my time on investigative 
reporting,” the amount of a respondent’s work that is investigative, and the number of 
investigative reporters at a station) loaded onto the third factor and explained 17.3% of the 
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variation. This dimension was called “Personal Productivity/Staff.” Because the first dimension 
explained the most variance and contained items that more thoroughly addressed issues of 
investigative quantity and quality, the eight measures were combined into a summed variable to 
allow for further analyses (M=3.13, SD=1.08). An internal consistency test indicated acceptable 
reliability (Cronbach’s α=.91) among the eight items (Nunnally, 1978). 
Biggest Investigative Obstacle. The final item on the survey was an open-ended 
question asking reporters to elaborate on the “biggest obstacle” facing investigative journalism at 
their stations. 
Content Analysis 
To compare reporters’ perceptions to actual investigative content, a content analysis of 
local television newscasts in fall 2014 and winter 2015 was conducted to help determine the 
quantity and quality of investigative journalism at survey respondents’ stations. The 165 stations 
represented in the investigative journalist survey were used as a sampling frame. Twenty stations 
were randomly drawn from each of four market rank categories used by Tuggle and Huffman 
(1999): markets 1-20, 21-50, 51-100, and 101-210. Some markets in the sampling frame were 
represented by two stations. This produced a total of 80 stations selected for coding. In terms of 
affiliation, 20 stations were ABC affiliates, 29 were CBS, 24 were NBC, and 13 were Fox (the 
affiliate total was greater than 80 because several newsrooms provided newscasts for multiple 
affiliates). 
A constructed week (one randomly selected Monday, one randomly selected Tuesday, 
etc.) of newscasts was then generated for each selected station from within the sweeps ratings 
period of October 30 to November 26, 2014. Each year, television station managers plan sweeps 
stories in advance, and thus organizational behavior during sweeps becomes a routinized pattern 
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(Gauthier, 2011a; Jacobs, 1990; Kaniss, 1991). Because of this, newsroom environments and 
investigative productivity at stations in November 2014 would likely be similar to November 
2013, when the survey was administered, even though there was a year between time periods. 
Sweeps newscasts were selected for coding because it is likely that many stations have higher 
investigative productivity during these ratings periods, and thus more stories would be available 
for examination (Gauthier, 2011a; Niederpruem, 2014). The constructed week in 2014 that was 
randomly selected was Monday, November 24, Tuesday, November 18, Wednesday, November 
12, Thursday, November 20, and Friday, November 21. This produced a sample of 400 
newscasts. 
Coders used an online streaming service, Metro Monitor, Inc., to view newscasts. Late-
in-the-day (e.g., 11 p.m.) newscasts are the most popular local TV news programs overall 
(Olmstead et al., 2013), so coders were instructed to analyze the latest available newscast on 
each day. Because Metro Monitor, Inc. stores newscasts for a limited amount of time, newscasts 
that had expired by the time of coding were replaced by newscasts from the subsequent sweeps 
period (January 29 to February 25, 2015) on the corresponding day of the week. The replacement 
week in 2015 that was randomly selected was Monday, February 2, Tuesday, February 10, 
Wednesday, February 11, Thursday, February 12, and Friday, February 13. For example, if a 
station’s latest newscast on Thursday, November 20, had expired, the latest newscast on 
Thursday, February 12, was chosen as a replacement. Six total newscasts from three stations 
were not coded because the stations’ November and February newscasts had both expired: 
KVUE in Austin, TX (two total newscasts were coded), WTVC in Chattanooga, TN (three total 
newscasts were coded), and KCRA in Sacramento, CA (four total newscasts were coded). Thus, 
the final sample consisted of 394 newscasts from 80 stations. 
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For logistical reasons, only the first 15 minutes of each newscast was coded. Late local 
TV newscasts usually last one half-hour and are structured similarly, with the most important 
stories toward the beginning (Tuggle, Carr, & Huffman, 2014); thus, it was likely that stations 
either aired or previewed all investigative pieces within the first 15 minutes. Coders were 
instructed to analyze every local “package” story that began within the first 15 minutes, was a 
full two minutes in length, and was an original, locally produced story. Local packages were 
defined as stories featuring the recorded voice of a local reporter. 
Coders were also instructed to analyze any package that was introduced or “teased” 
(previewed) as “investigative” within the first 15 minutes, even if the story was fewer than two 
minutes, and even if the full story aired after the 15-minute mark. For a story to be branded as 
investigative, it had to be introduced or previewed using some form of the word “investigate” 
(e.g., “investigation,” “I-Team,” “Channel 6 investigates,” “News 4 investigator”). The 
investigative word or phrase needed to refer to the station’s activity, and not the activity of an 
outside party. For instance, mention of a police “investigation” did not qualify. Coders indicated 
the presence or absence of investigative branding to help identify investigative stories, and also 
to draw a distinction between true investigative pieces and those that were merely presented as 
investigative. See Appendix B for the full coding protocol. 
Coders examined a total of 398 stories from 394 newscasts. Of those, 262 stories (65.8%) 
aired during the November 2014 sweeps period, and 136 stories (34.2%) aired during the 
February 2015 sweeps period. Regarding newscast times, 220 stories (55.3%) were part of an 11 
p.m. newscast, 170 stories (42.7%) were part of a 10 p.m. newscast, 3 stories (.8%) were part of 
a 9 p.m. newscast, and 5 stories (1.3%) were from a 6 p.m. newscast.   
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 Reliability. To improve the accuracy of the content analysis measurement instrument, 
several steps were taken to bolster reliability, a term defined as the extent to which measurement 
error is absent from an analysis (Alwin, 2007). Reliability helps a study’s validity and 
replicability (Nunnally, 1978) and is crucial in content analyses (Riffe, Fico, & Lacy, 2005). 
Measurement from just one person elicits questions of subjectivity; thus, it is necessary to use 
multiple coders for a reliability assessment (Baxter & Babbie, 2004). For the present project, 
three coders were used: the principal investigator and two graduate students. Coders were trained 
extensively in order to improve reliability. 
Training was done initially through assessments of content separate from, but similar to, 
the main population of units (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Bracken, 2010). The principal 
investigator developed a protocol and familiarized coders with the protocol during training (see 
Appendix B for the full protocol). To help ensure that content and not human bias dictated 
coding choices, coding categories in the protocol were mutually exclusive, and every effort was 
taken to explain them clearly (Riffe et al., 2005). After receiving training, coders in a group 
setting informally analyzed a small sample of newscasts containing investigative stories that 
were outside of the main sample. Once this informal assessment indicated acceptable reliability, 
pilot studies were conducted, during which trainees coded on their own (Lombard et al., 2010). 
To minimize human error and prevent fatigue, coders were strongly encouraged to read the 
coding protocol before each coding session (Riffe et al., 2005) and to limit coding to four hours 
per day (Baxter & Babbie, 2004). During the pilot testing stage, coder differences were settled 
through refinement of the protocol and further training. 
To formally test reliability, 53 newscasts (13.5%) were drawn from the main sample of 
394 newscasts; this subsample, which each coder analyzed, was large enough to properly 
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estimate agreement (Lombard et al., 2010; Riffe et al., 2005; Wimmer & Dominick, 2000). The 
remaining 347 newscasts were divided among the three coders. Krippendorff’s Alpha (α) 
measured agreement among coders; this measure is seen as preferable because it controls for 
chance agreement and estimates how content might be distributed in a larger population 
(Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al., 2005). Further, Krippendorff’s Alpha can estimate reliability 
among three coders and for nominal, interval, and ratio data, making it appropriate for this 
analysis. Four of the five content analysis variables met Krippendorff’s (2004) .80 minimum 
reliability threshold and Lombard et al.’s (2010) and Neuendorf’s (2002) .70 minimum threshold 
for exploratory variables (the measures section below lists individual reliability scores). After 
reliability was established, the principal investigator resolved disagreements among coders and 
incorporated the reliability subsample into the main coding sample (Lombard et al., 2010). 
Content Analysis Measures 
 The following measures were from the content analysis of local television stations: 
 Investigative Branding. Of the 398 total stories coded, 86 stories (21.6%) were branded 
as investigative, and 312 stories (78.4%) were not (Krippendorff’s α= .92.). Branding was seen 
as an indicator of commitment to producing investigative journalism. 
Length. Story length is seen as a representation of station commitment (Scott et al., 
2008; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Coders measured each of the 398 stories in total seconds 
(M=161.78, SD=55.51). Seconds were measured by marking the point in the newscast at which 
the story started and subtracting it from the point in the newscast at which the story ended. The 
resulting time was then converted to total seconds. For example, a story starting at the 12:00 
mark in a newscast and ending at 15:00 would be coded as having a length of 180. Coders used 
the time displays provided by Metro Monitor, Inc. on each streaming newscast to measure 
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length. The beginning of a story was defined as when a reporter started talking or the beginning 
of a package – whichever came first. The end of a story was defined as when the reporter 
finished talking or the end of a package – whichever came last. Including the anchor introduction 
in a story’s overall length would have produced a greater number of two-minute stories in the 
data set, but it is likely that many of these additional pieces would not have been investigative. 
Data from the content analysis supported the idea that investigative stories by themselves are two 
minutes or longer: 85% of coded stories that were branded as investigative were more than two 
minutes, and 93.5% of stories that were investigative by definition (see below) were more than 
two minutes. Additionally, stories that were investigative by definition had an average length of 
3 minutes, 41 seconds. The shortest story coded in the sample was 77 minutes; the longest was 
441 minutes (Krippendorff’s α= .99).  
 Story Count. The total number of stories coded from within each of the 394 newscasts 
(M=1.01, SD=.70). This measure provided a basis from which to draw conclusions about what 
percentage of a station’s stories were investigative. The most stories coded during a newscast 
was four; the fewest was zero (Krippendorff’s α= .90). 
 Concealed Information. Coders indicated the presence or absence of this investigative 
characteristic in each of the 398 stories. Stories with concealed information revealed evidence 
that was either: (A) deliberately suppressed; (B) concealed by law (e.g. classified CIA 
documents or medical records); or (C) public, but compiled by the reporter in a way that exposed 
a widespread pattern (e.g., an analysis of city government expense reports revealing that council 
members were using taxpayer money to fund personal vacations). This characteristic is present is 
most definitions of investigative journalism (see, e.g., Cordell, 2009; Houston, 2009; Ullman & 
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Honeyman, 1983). Concealed information was present in 70 stories, or 17.6% of the sample 
(Krippendorff’s α= .83). 
 Public Interest. Coders indicated the presence or absence of this investigative 
characteristic in each of the 398 stories. Stories in the public interest revealed that a powerful 
entity had done harm to a citizen or citizens. A powerful entity was defined as either: (A) 
government (e.g., a police officer or city council); (B) public institution (e.g., a public 
university); or (C) large private entity (e.g., a corporation or hospital). “Harm” was defined as an 
act that negatively affected the: (A) health; (B) quality of life; (C) safety; or (D) money/property 
of a citizen or citizens. A similar characteristic is present in most investigative definitions (see, 
e.g., Aucoin, 2006; Bernt & Greenwald, 2000; de Burgh, 2008; Investigative Reporters and 
Editors, 2015). A total of 120 coded stories, or 30.2% of the sample, were determined to be in 
the public interest (Krippendorff’s α= .63). 
 Investigative Score. A scale (0-2) was constructed measuring the “score” of all 398 
individual stories. A score of “2” meant that a story contained both “Concealed Information” and 
“Public Interest,” and was considered “fully” investigative; a score of “1” meant that a story 
contained one of the characteristics; a score of “0” meant that a story contained neither of the 
characteristics (M=.48, SD=.69). This was seen as a measurement of the investigative properties 
of each story. 
 The following variables were measured at the station level by averaging content analysis 
data for each station in the study (N=80): 
Branded Investigative Percentage. The number of stories that each station branded as 
investigative during the constructed week was divided by that station’s total number of stories 
coded during the constructed week (M=.19, SD=.24). For example, a station with one 
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investigative-branded story and five total stories during the constructed week would have a 
branded investigative percentage of “.20.” The percentage of stories that a station presents as 
investigative provides a quantitative measure of commitment to this type of journalism. The 
highest branded investigative percentage among all stations in the sample was 1.00; the lowest 
was .00. 
 Full Investigative Percentage. The total number of stories with an investigative score of 
“2,” containing both “Concealed Information” and “Public Interest,” at each station during the 
constructed week was divided by that station’s total number of stories coded during the 
constructed week (M=.11, SD=.19). For example, a station with one fully investigative story and 
five total stories during the constructed week would have a full investigative percentage of “.20.” 
The percentage of fully investigative stories at a station measures the quantity of actual 
investigative work being done, rather than the quantity of stories that a station presents as 
investigative. The highest full investigative percentage at a station in the sample was 1.00; the 
lowest was .00. 
Quality Index. The investigative scores (0-2) for each station’s investigative-branded 
stories were summed, and then divided by the number of investigative-branded stories at that 
station, producing an “average” score (M=1.25, SD=.59). For example, if a station had 10 
branded stories during the constructed week of newscasts and the total score for all 10 stories 
was “10,” then the station’s quality index would be “1.” This was preferable to Full Investigative 
Percentage as a measure of quality because it accounted for stories that scored a “1,” rather than 
only accounting for stories that scored a full “2” on the investigative scale. The highest quality 
index at a station in the sample was 2.00; the lowest was .00. 
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 Investigative Length. The average length of a station’s investigative-branded stories, 
measured in seconds (M=198.40, SD=74.66). Investigative-branded stories, rather than fully 
investigative stories, were chosen for this category because investigative branding indicates a 
station’s commitment to that story. Because length has been connected to a station’s emphasis on 
quality (see, e.g., Scott et al., 2008), the length of an investigative-branded story is a meaningful 
measure of how much a station is committed to investigative quality. The highest average 
investigative length for a station in the sample was 427 minutes; the lowest was 84. 
 Non-Investigative Percentage. The number of a station’s investigative-branded stories 
that had an investigative score of either “1” or “0” (i.e., branded stories that were missing the 
“Concealed Information” characteristic, the “Public Interest” characteristic, or both) during the 
constructed week was divided by that station’s total number of stories coded during the 
constructed week (M=.58, SD=.38). For example, a station that had two branded stories that 
scored either a “1” or “0” and four total branded stories during the constructed week would have 
a Non-Investigative Percentage of “.50.” This measured the amount of “soft” investigative 
stories that a station produced. The highest non-investigative percentage at a station was 1.00; 
the lowest was .00. 
Organizational and Market Measures 
 The following measures were gathered through analysis of local television organizations 
and local television markets:  
 Public Ownership. Stations were grouped into those that were owned by publicly traded 
corporations and those that were not. Ownership data were gathered from the Complete 
Television, Radio & Cable Industry Directory (2014) and cross-referenced against Google 
Finance, TVnewscheck.com, Manta.com, and other websites. Of the 165 respondents in the 
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survey, 76 (46.1%) worked for stations owned by publicly traded companies. Six of the eight 
companies that owned the most stations in the survey were publicly traded, including Sinclair, 
which owned the most stations (14), and Media General, which owned the fourth-most stations 
(8). However, Raycom Media (12 stations) and the Hearst Corporation (9 stations), which owned 
the second- and third-most stations in the survey, respectively, were private companies. The top 
four organizations owned more than a quarter (26.1%) of the stations in the survey. For the 
purposes of this project, the company that was in control as of December 31, 2013, was defined 
as the station owner. Public ownership was used to operationalize a corporate news entity. 
 Market Size. This was operationalized as the number of television households in each of 
the 210 U.S. markets, according to Nielsen estimates for the 2013-2014 TV season (Halbrooks, 
2013). The largest market in the survey, New York, had 7,461,030 households; the smallest 
market, Glendive, MT, had 4,260 households (M=762,432.97, SD=915,481.56). The median 
number of households in the survey was 457,600. 
 Competition Level. This was operationalized as the number of commercial stations in 
each of the 210 U.S. markets (M=7.29, SD=3.52). Data were gathered from the Complete 
Television, Radio & Cable Industry Directory (2014). Although Nielsen shares are a preferable 
measure of market competition level in some circumstances, the number of commercial stations 
in a market is also valid (Lacy & Vermeer, 1995), and was logistically feasible for the present 
project. The market with the most stations was Los Angeles (23 stations); Lafayette, IN, and 
Glendive, MT, tied for the fewest (1 station). 
For some results in the following chapter, both conventional (p< .05, p< .01, p< .001) and 
marginal (p< .10) significance levels were reported. This was done because the sample sizes for 
most analyses were relatively small, which tends to increase sampling error (Beam, Weaver, & 
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Brownlee, 2009; Nunnally, 1978). Less stringent, or marginal, standards allow for potentially 
important relationships to be highlighted. Significance levels were clearly noted in the 
corresponding tables. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
FINDINGS 
 
 RQ1 asked about the overall quantity of investigative journalism at local TV stations. To 
answer this question, all 398 coded stories were analyzed for investigative properties. As Table 2 
shows, 17.6% of all stories contained “Concealed Information,” and 30.2% contained “Public 
Interest.” Table 3 shows that nearly two-thirds of all stories (63.8%) contained neither 
investigative characteristic and thus had an investigative score of “0.” In other words, almost 
two-thirds were not at all investigative. About a quarter (24.6%) of all stories had one 
investigative characteristic, and 11.6% had both characteristics. This suggests that during the 
sweeps periods that were sampled, coded stories had about a one-in-nine likelihood of being 
fully investigative.  
 To further explore RQ1, the number of “branded” investigative stories (86) was divided 
by the total number of stories coded (398). Using this approach, data indicated that 21.6% of 
stories had investigative branding (Table 4). The remaining 312 stories (78.4%) were not 
branded by the station as investigative. In sum, roughly one out of every five stories was branded 
as investigative, but only one in nine was actually investigative by definition (being in the public 
interest and containing concealed information). Additionally, fewer than half (47.5%) of all 
stations (N= 80) aired investigative-branded stories during the constructed week. However, 
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reporters in the survey (N=165) indicated that at 53.9% of stations, investigative reporting had 
increased somewhat or increased significantly within the past year. 
 RQ2 asked about the overall quality of investigative journalism at local TV stations. To 
answer this question, the 86 investigative-branded stories in the sample were analyzed. As Table 
2 shows, 65.1% of these branded stories contained “Concealed Information,” and 59.3% 
contained “Public Interest.” Table 5 shows that 17 investigative-branded stories (19.8%) had an 
investigative score of “0,” 31 stories (36.0%) scored a “1,” and 38 stories (44.2%) scored a “2,” 
so fewer than half of all branded stories contained both investigative characteristics. The average 
investigative score across all branded stories was 1.24 (SD=.77).   
 To further explore RQ2, length was used as a measure of quality. First, though, a 
moderate correlation (r= .32, p< .01) between length and “Investigative Score” among all stories 
(N=398) showed, at least, the face validity of using length as a quality measure. More 
specifically, Table 6 shows that the 86 investigative-branded stories in the sample averaged 
193.05 seconds (SD=73.68), while non-branded stories averaged 153.16 seconds (SD=45.89); 
this mean difference was significant at the p< .001 level, by the t-test. Also shown in Table 6, 
fully investigative stories (packages with both “Concealed Information” and “Public Interest” 
attributes) averaged 221.61 seconds (SD=87.45), while non-fully investigative stories averaged 
153.96 seconds (SD=44.44); this mean difference was significant at the p< .001 level. Table 7 
shows that among the 86 stories that were branded investigative, those that were not fully 
investigative averaged 169.27 seconds (SD=53.10), while stories that were both branded 
investigative and fully investigative by definition averaged 223.08 seconds (SD=85.02); this 
mean difference was significant at the p< .01 level. These significant differences indicate that 
stories that are more investigative, either by branding or by definition, tend to be longer. The 
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results also show that stories that are investigative by definition are likely to be longer than those 
that are merely branded as investigative.   
 Before examining tests of hypotheses, these measures of investigative journalism quality 
and quantity merit exploration in terms of important theoretical concepts that permeate the 
scholarly literature.  Bivariate Pearson’s r correlations were calculated to explore these concepts. 
Among investigative journalist survey respondents (N=165), there was a small negative 
correlation (r= -.21, p< .01) between perceived company emphasis on profit and emphasis on 
investigative news (Table 8). This connection suggests that profit-oriented companies are 
perceived by journalists as loath to support investigative journalism. Predictably, market size was 
strongly correlated with competition (r= .72, p< .001). Larger markets tend to generate a greater 
amount of advertising revenue and audience niches, and thus can support more competitors. 
Accordingly, staff size shared moderate correlations with both market size (r= .57, p< .001) and 
competition (r= .52, p< .001). Because larger markets generate more revenue, stations in those 
markets can afford to hire more employees to cover the news. Finally, perceived station 
investigative emphasis was correlated with market size (r= .25, p< .01), competition (r= .20, p< 
.05), and staff size (r= .31, p< .001). This suggests that investigative journalism is often found at 
larger stations in larger markets with more competitors. 
 Table 9 presents correlations for stations in the content analysis. Staff size was correlated 
with market size (r= .53, p< .001) and competition (r= .51, p< .001). Staff size was also weakly 
correlated with the percentage of a station’s stories that were fully investigative (r= .23, p< .05) 
and with the rate of investigative-branded stories at a station (r= .29, p< .05). Stations with larger 
news staffs can often free up reporters to work on investigations while other reporters handle 
day-to-day news. Market size was strongly correlated with competition (r= .75, p< .001), and 
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shared marginally significant relationships with fully investigative stories (r= .22, p< .10) and 
investigative-branded stories (r= .22, p< .10). Although the connection was not strong, these 
results suggest that stations in larger markets produce more news that is branded investigative, 
and also more news that is investigative by definition. 
 As shown in Table 9, fully investigative stories shared a strong positive correlation with 
investigative-branded stories (r= .77, p< .001). This indicates that stations producing 
investigative-branded stories are also producing fully investigative stories, and engaging, at least 
somewhat, in a type of “truth in branding.” Fully investigative stories also shared a correlation 
with the investigative quality index variable (r= .64, p< .001). Recall that the quality index was 
each station’s average investigative score across all investigative-branded stories. Fully 
investigative stories had a marginally significant relationship with the length of investigative-
branded stories (r= .28, p< .10). Fully investigative stories were also strongly negatively 
correlated with the percentage of non-investigative stories (r= -.74, p< .001). The quality index 
variable was moderately correlated with investigative length (r= .50, p< .01), indicating that the 
length of an investigative-branded story is related to investigative quality. The quality index 
further shared a strong negative relationship with the rate of non-investigative stories at a station 
(r= -.88, p< .001), and the length of investigative stories had a negative correlation with the 
amount of non-investigative stories at a station (r= -.52, p< .01); these two correlations suggest 
that branded investigative stories that are not investigative by definition are low in quality. The 
percentage of branded investigative journalism at a station was not correlated with the quality 
index or investigative length, which indicates that stories branded as “investigative” are not 
necessarily high quality. 
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Finally, Table 9 shows that a station’s perceived investigative emphasis was moderately 
correlated with staff size (r= .28, p< .05), market size (r= .27, p< .05), and competition (r= .27, 
p< .05), and negatively correlated with perceived profit emphasis (r= -.25, p< .01). Investigative 
emphasis was also significantly correlated with fully investigative stories (r= .34, p< .01), 
branded investigative stories (r= .37, p< .01), the quality index (r= .36, p< .05), and negatively 
correlated with the percentage of non-investigative stories (r= -.38, p< .05), indicating that 
perceptions of investigative productivity are associated with actual investigative quantity and 
quality. 
 To address H1 (a, b, and c), H2 (a, b, and c), H3 (a, b, and c), H4 (a, b, and c), H5 (a, b, 
and c), and RQ3 (a, b, and c), five multiple linear regression analyses were used to predict two 
measures of investigative quantity, two measures of quality, and one measure of investigative 
emphasis. For each of the five analyses, the same five predictor variables were used: profit 
emphasis and staff size (determined from survey responses), along with public ownership, 
market size, and competition (determined from organizational and market analyses). Two 
criterion variables represented quantity: the percentage of fully investigative stories and the 
percentage of branded investigative stories. Two criterion variables represented quality: 
investigative length and the quality index. Finally, the investigative emphasis variable (a 
summed measure of survey responses) was used as a criterion. Secondary analyses showed little 
multicollinearity among predictors; the lowest tolerance score for any of the predictors was .40, 
and the highest Variance Inflation Factor score for the predictors was 2.53. 
 H1 projected that a station’s emphasis on profit, as perceived by its investigative 
reporters, would negatively predict investigative (a) quantity, (b) quality, and (c) emphasis. As 
Table 10 shows, a station’s profit emphasis did share a negative relationship with the two 
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quantity variables, full investigative percentage (standardized β= -.160) and branded 
investigative percentage (β= -.131), but results were not significant. Therefore, H1a was not 
supported. Profit emphasis also did not significantly predict the two quality criteria, quality 
index (β= -.003) and investigative length (β= .071), so H1b was not supported (Table 11). 
However, profit emphasis did significantly predict a decrease in a station’s perceived 
investigative emphasis (β= -.220, p< .01). Thus, H1c was supported (Table 12). This result 
indicates that investigative reporters’ perceptions of how much a station focuses on profit predict 
their perceptions of how much investigative journalism is being done. Respondents themselves, 
it seems, associate profit with a decrease in investigative productivity. 
 H2 predicted that, holding other factors constant, staff size would be positively related to 
investigative (a) quantity, (b) quality, and (c) emphasis. The size of a station’s newsroom did 
positively predict the number of full investigative stories (β= .140) and branded investigative 
stories (β= .171), but results were not significant (Table 10). Therefore, H2a was not supported. 
Staff size did not significantly predict either quality criterion (quality index [β= -.124], length 
[β= .156]), so H2b was not supported (Table 11). However, staff size did significantly predict a 
station’s investigative emphasis (β= .241, p< .01), so H2c was supported (Table 12). This result 
suggests that perceptions of investigative quantity and quality can be predicted by the size of a 
news staff, which, along with the H1c outcome, seems intuitively logical. 
 H3 projected that market size would positively predict investigative (a) quantity, (b) 
quality, and (c) emphasis. The size of the market in which a station was located, measured by the 
number of TV households, did not significantly predict any of the quantity criteria in Table 10 
(fully investigative [β= .209], branded investigative [β= .060]) or the quality criteria in Table 11 
(quality index [β= .318], length [β= -.043]). Market size also did not significantly affect 
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perceived investigative emphasis in Table 12 (β= .078). Therefore, H3a, H3b, and H3c were 
not supported. This indicates that market size does not predict the investigative productivity of 
local television stations. 
 H4 predicted that, holding other factors constant, the level of competition in a market 
would be positively related to a station’s investigative (a) quantity, (b) quality, and (c) emphasis. 
Competition, measured by the number of commercial stations in a market, did not predict any of 
the investigative journalism quantity criteria in Table 10 (fully investigative [β= -.143], branded 
investigative [β= -.035]) or the quality criteria in Table 11 (quality index [β= -.180], length [β= -
.127]). Competition also did not predict perceived investigative emphasis in Table 12 (β= -.032). 
Therefore, H4a, H4b, and H4c were not supported. This suggests that the number of 
commercial competitors does not predict the investigative productivity of local television 
stations. 
 H5 predicted that a station owned by a publicly traded company would yield higher 
investigative (a) quantity, (b) quality, and (c) emphasis, holding other factors constant. Public 
ownership status did not significantly predict the percentage of fully investigative stories at a 
station (β= .108), but, as Table 10 shows, ownership did significantly predict the percentage of 
investigative-branded stories (β= .263, p< .05). Therefore, H5a was partially supported. Public 
ownership had no significant effect on the quality criteria shown in Table 11 (quality index [β= -
.071], length [β= -.160]), so H5b was not supported. However, a station’s public ownership 
status significantly predicted perceived emphasis on investigative news (β= .170, p< .05), so H5c 
was supported (Table 12). These results suggest that public ownership predicts perceptions of 
investigative productivity, and the actual quantity of investigative journalism, but not 
investigative quality. 
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 RQ3 asked which of the five predictor variables (profit emphasis, staff size, market size, 
competition, public ownership) was the strongest predictor of a station’s investigative: (a) 
quantity, (b) quality, and (c) emphasis. Overall, market size and public ownership had the largest 
effects. Market size was the strongest predictor of fully investigative quantity (β= .209) and the 
quality index (β= .318), shown in Tables 10 and 11, respectively, but neither of these 
relationships was significant. Public ownership was the strongest predictor of branded 
investigative quantity in Table 10 (β= .263, p< .05) and investigative length in Table 11 (β= -
.160), but only the relationship with branded investigative stories was significant. Finally, Table 
12 shows that staff size was the strongest predictor of a station’s investigative emphasis (β= .241, 
p< .01). 
 H6 predicted that the proportion of a station’s branded investigative stories that were 
“non-investigative” would increase as the level of competition increased in that station’s market. 
Correlational analysis (Table 9) showed no relationship between competition and the percentage 
of non-investigative stories (r= .07, ns). Therefore, H6 was not supported. This suggests that 
increased competition does not increase the amount of investigative-branded stories a station 
produces that are non-investigative by definition. 
 In summary, data showed that about 18% of all stories and 65% of investigative-branded 
stories contained the investigative characteristic of “Concealed Information.” About 30% of all 
stories and 59% of investigative-branded stories contained the “Public Interest” characteristic. 
Local television stations branded nearly 22% of all stories as investigative, but just 12% of 
stories were fully investigative by definition (i.e., they contained “Public Interest” and 
“Concealed Information”). Approximately 25% of all stories contained just one of the 
investigative characteristics. Of the 86 investigative-branded stories that were coded, less than 
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half (44.6%) were defined as fully investigative; 36% of branded stories were partially 
investigative, containing just one of the investigative characteristics. 
 The more investigative a story was, the longer it was likely to be. Branded stories were 
approximately 21% longer, on average, than non-branded stories, and fully investigative stories 
were about 31% longer than stories that lacked at least one investigative characteristic. The 
average fully investigative story was about 15% longer than the average investigative-branded 
story, and stories that were both branded and defined as investigative were about 24% longer, on 
average, than stories that were branded as investigative but lacked at least one investigative 
characteristic.  
 Several of the models’ predictors shared significant relationships with perceived 
investigative emphasis. Public corporate ownership (β= .170), staff size (β= .241), and perceived 
profit emphasis (β= -.220) significantly predicted investigative emphasis. In addition, market 
size (r= .25), staff size (r= .31), profit emphasis (r= -.21), and competition (r= .20) were 
significantly correlated with investigative emphasis. Among quantity variables, only public 
ownership (β= .263) was significantly predictive of investigative-branded story production. In 
fact, the public ownership variable was significantly predictive of more criteria (investigative 
emphasis and percentage of branded investigative stories) than any other measure. The 
percentage of fully investigative stories and the percentage of branded stories (both of which 
signified quantity) were significantly correlated with staff size (r= .23, r= .29, respectively) and 
market size (r= .22, r= .22, respectively). However, predictor variables were not significantly 
related to investigative quality, as expected in the hypotheses, and increased competition did not 
lead to increased production of investigative stories that were not investigative by definition. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Discussion 
 There are several potential limitations to this study. Regarding the survey method, about 
one-third of respondents were part-time investigative journalists. A sample of only full-time 
reporters might produce a fuller picture of how investigative journalists see their profession, but 
might also exclude reporters in smaller markets, who tend to divide their time between 
investigative and non-investigative stories. Second, although journalists’ stations were chosen 
randomly, individual journalists self-selected whether to participate. Third, journalists’ 
estimations of staff size and perceptions of stations’ commitment to investigative news and 
emphasis on profit include measurement error. Most respondents (76.4%) were either somewhat 
satisfied or very satisfied with their jobs; however, investigative journalists, compared to general 
assignment reporters, might be more pessimistic about certain items affecting their profession, 
including a station’s emphasis on profit, because investigative reporters face these challenges 
more often. Therefore, investigative journalists’ survey responses could be more negative than 
responses from general assignment reporters. Additionally, overall perceptions of investigative 
quantity were likely higher than average because all respondents indicated that investigative 
work was done at their stations; recall that stations without investigative reporters were excluded 
from the study. Fourth, the sample was slightly skewed toward larger markets. The median TV 
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market rank (1=New York; 210=Glendive, MT) of respondents’ stations was 65, and 68% of 
respondents were in the top 100 Designated Market Areas. However, overrepresentation of large 
markets is to be expected because stations in more populated areas are more likely to have 
investigative reporters, and tend to have more of them (the Spearman’s correlation between 
market size and the number of investigative reporters at a station was ρ= .60, p< .001).  
 Similarly, large markets were also more prevalent than small markets in the content 
analysis; recall that the sample included 20 stations in each of the market rank categories (1-20, 
21-50, 51-100, 101-210). The coding sample contained data from 85% of the top 20 markets (17 
of 20), but only 16% of markets (18 of 110) in the smallest category. Thus, bigger markets 
figured more prominently in the data. Second, coders did not analyze entire newscasts; instead, 
for logistical reasons, they analyzed stories that aired or were teased in the first 15 minutes of 
each newscast. Because of this, some investigative stories toward the end of newscasts could 
have been missed, although this is not likely (Tuggle et al., 2014). Third, sample newscasts from 
November 24th featured an abnormally large amount of breaking news coverage because of 
events surrounding the Michael Brown shooting case. Although this out-of-the-ordinary event 
took precedence over pre-planned stories, several stations in the sample were still able to air 
investigative packages within the first 15 minutes on this date. Fourth, sampled newscasts aired 
during sweeps ratings periods. News managers often alter content during sweeps to maximize 
ratings, and thus stories that were sampled might not be representative of year-round local 
television programming. Including sweeps and non-sweeps newscasts would have controlled for 
stations attempting to increase ratings (Greeley, 2014; Scott, Gobetz, & Chanslor, 2008). 
However, including non-sweeps dates would have decreased the chances that stations would air 
investigative stories (Gauthier, 2011a; Niederpruem, 2014), especially in smaller markets where 
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stations often have fewer resources. Therefore, sweeps dates were selected to provide for a larger 
sample of investigative reporting. In sum, because content analysis stations were drawn from a 
pool of stations that produced investigative journalism, because the sample week included 
sweeps dates, and because the sample was skewed toward larger markets, the number of 
investigative stories coded was probably higher than normal. 
 Fifth, for logistical reasons, the content analysis data were collected one year after the 
survey data, so comparing results from both analyses could be problematic. Sixth, the market 
competition variable (number of commercial stations) was limited because it treated every 
television competitor as equal and didn’t take into account actual market shares. A measure that 
accounted for Nielsen shares might have been a more valid representation of market competition, 
but this information was not available for the time period studied. The competition variable was 
further limited in its scope because it measured only TV rivals; local stations also compete with 
cable television, internet sources, radio stations, and newspapers for consumers’ attention. 
 Finally, the definition of investigative journalism used in the content analysis (original 
stories in the “Public Interest” that featured “Concealed Information”) was necessarily limited 
because it was used for quantitative content analysis. Although this definition was supported by 
the literature, it could not encompass all aspects of investigative reporting due to the need for 
agreement among coders. For example, one investigative-branded story focused on a bill in the 
California legislature that threatened to invade citizens’ privacy by tracking their movements. 
The bill had been proposed but had not been passed, and thus coders determined that the story 
was not in the “Public Interest” because it dealt with potential harm instead of actual harm. One 
could argue that the traditional watchdog duty of the press is to provide “surveillance” of 
potential threats, but investigative stories typically feature harm that has already occurred. This 
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difficulty in limiting investigative journalism to a short definition further manifested itself during 
the training of coders. Despite several reliability tests, the “Public Interest” variable never 
reached the desired minimum reliability score of .80. The trouble inherent in narrowly defining 
investigative journalism may also be a reason why quantitative researchers have given this 
subject limited attention.  
 Despite its drawbacks, this study suggests that the amount of investigative journalism in 
local television is fairly low. This is especially true when one considers that stations in the 
sample had already indicated that they produced investigative journalism, and that newscasts 
were analyzed during a time when investigative productivity was assumed to be higher than 
normal. Just a fifth of all stories were branded as investigative, and more than half of the stations 
examined presented no investigative-branded stories at all during the sample week. As a point of 
comparison, just a quarter of local TV news directors in 2002 said their newsrooms conducted no 
investigative journalism (Just et al., 2002). This indicates a possible investigative decline. A 
majority of the long-form local television news stories that were analyzed did not possess any 
investigative characteristics, and about a quarter of all news packages had just one investigative 
characteristic. Only a fraction of all stories were investigative by definition, containing both 
characteristics. Most investigative-branded stories were not investigative by definition, 
indicating that a large percentage of local television investigations are not as they seem. Among 
all stories coded, the “Public Interest” characteristic was more prevalent than “Concealed 
Information,” but neither characteristic was overly common. 
 Even though content analysis indicated low levels of investigative news, survey 
respondents were optimistic – more than half of reporters indicated that investigative journalism 
had increased at their stations. In their open-ended responses, some reporters were bullish on 
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investigative prospects. One small market reporter said that investigative journalism resources 
have been slashed in the past, but now station managers are realizing that was a “mistake,” and 
are “putting more resources into investigative coverage.” A reporter in a top-50 market wrote 
that “more jobs are being created for investigative journalists than two years ago, which is a 
great thing.” Thus, it is possible that journalists perceive their stations to be more committed to 
investigative journalism than they actually are.  
 Findings suggested that overall quality is low for investigative stories on local television. 
About a third of branded stories contained just one investigative characteristic, and nearly 20% 
of branded stories contained no investigative characteristics. In their open-ended survey 
responses, several reporters lamented the prevalence of “investigative” news that is anything but. 
A top-20 market reporter wrote, “There’s no mistaking – the craft has been watered down. The 
term ‘investigative reporting’ has largely been reduced to a ‘catch-all’ phrase and a promotional 
tool. Getting a copy of an indictment and knocking on someone’s door is not investigative 
reporting. ‘Does it Work?’ segments are not, repeat not investigative reporting (emphasis in 
original).” One top-50 market reporter wrote that a competing station in his market “routinely 
takes stories published in the newspaper, gussies them up with a confrontation and some jazzy 
graphics, and relentlessly brands those stories as ‘investigative.’ They are not, and we struggle to 
separate what we do from what they do.” 
 Stations that were perceived by reporters as placing a higher emphasis on investigative 
work were likely to produce more investigative stories and higher quality investigative stories in 
the content analysis. Stations that produced investigative-branded stories were likely to also 
produce fully investigative stories, but there was no connection between a station’s production of 
branded stories and level of quality, indicating that investigative branding does not always 
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translate into better journalism. Among investigative-branded stories, the “Concealed 
Information” characteristic was slightly more prevalent than “Public Interest.” 
 Content analysis results suggest that the more investigative a story is, the longer it is 
likely to be. Among all stories coded, investigative-branded stories were significantly longer than 
non-branded stories, and fully investigative stories were significantly longer than stories that 
were not fully investigative. The average fully investigative story was longer than the average 
investigative-branded story, and the longest stories were those that were both branded and fully 
investigative. This suggests that length is related to quality, and that length denotes a station’s 
commitment to investigative journalism. 
 A station’s staff size was related to its market size, and related to competition within that 
market. Further, market size and competition were correlated. These relationships make intuitive 
sense because larger markets can support a greater diversity of television content and different 
types of audiences, thus encouraging more stations to compete within the market and serve the 
various audience tastes. Stations in larger markets, with more potential viewers, tend to generate 
more advertising revenue and therefore can afford to hire more employees. 
 The strongest predictor of a station’s investigative production was ownership status. As 
expected, stations owned by publicly traded companies produced significantly more 
investigative-branded stories, even when controlling for a station’s market, staff size, level of 
competition, and perceived profit emphasis. Journalists working for publicly traded corporations 
also reported a significantly higher level of investigative emphasis at their stations. Ownership 
status did not affect the amount of fully investigative stories produced or the quality of 
investigative stories. However, investigative-branded stories are still likely higher in quality than 
most TV reports, so these findings show a positive connection between corporate ownership and 
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news quality and lend support to journalism studies touting the positive effects of corporations 
(see, e.g., Akhavan-Majid and Boudreau, 1995; Demers, 1996; Kim, 2009). These results also 
run counter to literature and popular sentiment suggesting that corporations hurt news quality 
(see, e.g., Dunaway, 2008; Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; McManus, 1994). It is possible 
that the corporate structure allows news managers more freedom to pursue investigative 
journalism, as some research suggested, or that corporate bosses see investigative journalism as a 
way to distinguish a company’s brand and improve ratings. The latter idea was reinforced by the 
opinion of one large-market survey respondent who worked at a station owned by Gannett, a 
publicly traded corporation: “I am fortunate (that) our station, our company and the industry as a 
whole recognize that investigative journalism can have a major positive effect on ratings.” 
Another large-market reporter similarly stressed the positive effect his parent corporation had on 
investigative journalism at his station: “Comcast/NBC has re-invested mightily in its TV news 
operations at the station level after massive cuts by (the) previous owner. Stations are still re-
building so resources remain an issue but it’s nothing compared to the dark days of 2008-2011.” 
Despite the link between corporate ownership and investigative quantity, the lack of connection 
between corporations and quality could indicate that publicly traded companies are focusing 
more on the production of investigative reports and less on the quality of those reports. 
 Companies that placed a high emphasis on profit were likely to de-emphasize 
investigative news. This expected result lends support to literature drawing a connection between 
the quest for profit and investigative shortcomings (see, e.g., Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; 
Houston, 2006). Because of the expensive and resource-intensive nature of investigative 
reporting, profit-minded companies likely see it as an expendable practice, despite Belt and 
Just’s (2008) study showing that investigative journalism is associated with higher local 
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television ratings. The negative relationship between profit and investigative news was supported 
by some survey respondents; one top-50 market reporter remarked, “The relentless pursuit of 
ratings is the destructive force that constantly undermines the effort to provide a consistent 
public service approach to investigative reporting. Investigations have been killed and failed to 
launch because of the perception that they will hurt ratings. Stories that should be cut back are 
pushed forward if they have proven to increase ratings (emphasis in original).” A like-minded 
large-market reporter wrote, “Profits vs. Resources is the biggest obstacle. Company is unwilling 
to pay (for) travel, pay for testing, pay for FOIA’s (government information requests), and seeks 
ways to get it done for free, such as having a university run tests.” One small-market reporter 
emphasized the importance of the bottom line at her station by writing that managers would pay 
for only about $10 worth of documents from county clerks; another wrote that producers at her 
station did not support investigative reporting because they didn’t think it would “sell.” 
 However, the perceived connection between profit emphasis and investigative production 
was not supported by content analysis data. A station’s emphasis on profit predicted lower 
amounts of both investigative-branded and fully investigative stories, but results were not 
significant, and profit emphasis was not related to investigative quality. These findings indicate 
that a newsroom’s emphasis on profit is perhaps not as destructive as investigative reporters 
believe it to be. Recall that because these journalists are faced with investigative challenges each 
day, they are possibly more pessimistic about the effects of profit-seeking executives. 
 As expected, newsrooms with large staffs were more likely to emphasize investigative 
journalism, lending support to the idea that more reporters, producers, and photographers are 
needed for a station to properly conduct investigative journalism. This is chiefly because in 
smaller newsrooms, investigative reporters are more likely to work “double-duty,” churning out 
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daily news reports while simultaneously attempting to work on long-term investigations. Many 
respondents in understaffed newsrooms supported this line of thinking by writing that the need to 
produce a story every day (described as “feeding the daily beast,” or “feeding the daily furnace”) 
was the biggest obstacle blocking their investigative efforts. One reporter at such a station wrote 
“the climate in the newsroom is such that if you are not turning a story that day they simply 
cannot leave you alone. Depth is not something this newsroom pursues (emphasis in original).” 
A medium-sized market investigative reporter wrote that “I constantly face pressure to turn news 
reports every day. It is hard to get 2 or 3 days to investigate, write, research and edit an 
investigative piece! (emphasis in original)” One small-market reporter said “only one time has 
my news director allowed me not to do a daily-turn story in order to work on an investigative 
piece.” 
 Staff size was correlated with a station’s production of investigative-branded and fully 
investigative stories, and also predicted higher investigative quantity once other factors were 
held constant, but this prediction was not significant. Staff size also did not significantly predict 
investigative quality as had been expected. In sum, although many of the statistical relationships 
between staff size and investigative news lean in the same “direction,” they cast doubt on the 
perception that bigger staffs are used to produce more and better investigative journalism. 
 Market size was not significantly related to investigative productivity, which was 
surprising. The number of households in a market was correlated with investigative quantity and 
emphasis, but once other factors were held constant, market size had no significant effect on 
either aspect. The number of households was the strongest predictor of fully investigative reports 
and of the quality index, but these predictions were non-significant. This was unexpected 
because literature suggests that larger markets allow for a greater diversity of audience tastes, 
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including a preference for investigative journalism (see, e.g., Berkowitz, 2007; McManus, 1994). 
It is possible that the effect of market size on investigative reporting is overrated, and that other 
factors are truly at play. It is also worth asking if market size should be measured at the ratio 
level, as it was in this study. Because Nielsen markets are ranked, a case could be made that 
television market size should only be measured at the ordinal level; it is possible that ordinal 
measurement might have produced different results. Several local television studies have used 
ordinal rankings to represent market size (see, e.g., Coulson et al., 2001; Yanich, 2012). 
However, the ratio-level data that accompanied Nielsen market rankings (number of households) 
were used because they provided a more exact measurement. 
 Competition was not strongly related to investigative news. There was a correlation 
between the number of commercial stations in a market and investigative emphasis, but once 
other factors were controlled for, this relationship disappeared. Competition level did not predict 
investigative quantity, quality, or emphasis. These findings were unexpected because literature 
suggested that investigative news might be a way for stations to differentiate themselves and 
establish legitimacy in a competitive market (Lowrey, 2005; McManus, 1994; Lowrey & Woo, 
2010). Although it was not supported statistically, some survey respondents said investigative 
reporting was indeed an effective way for stations to “stand out” from the competition. One top-
20 market reporter wrote that “investigations are one of the few vehicles that allow a station to 
present unique promotable content.” A reporter who worked in a medium-sized market wrote, 
“Most market research indicates (investigative) journalism is the #1 factor in media preference. 
Most TV stations are dramatically increasing visibility of investigative reports (emphasis in 
original).” Another reporter said stations are starting to rebuild investigative units as a “reason to 
watch,” and another said her station tries to “win viewers with unique, investigative stories.” 
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 Market competition was not related to the amount of “non-investigative” investigations at 
a station, a finding that was also unexpected. This suggests that competitive demands are not 
causing station managers to cut corners in their investigative reports. It is possible that news 
managers are pouring resources into investigative journalism whether they are in a competitive 
environment or not; another possibility is that competition is actually driving investigative 
quality and quantity, but would be better measured by analyzing Nielsen market shares. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 The findings in this study are a bit troubling. For years, critics and scholars have warned 
of the decline of investigative and public affairs journalism on local television and the effect it 
could have on society (see, e.g., Anderson, 2010; Higgins-Dobney & Sussman, 2013; Lewis, 
2014). Many have denounced the pervasiveness of frivolous television “investigations” that warn 
us of the dangers of frozen yogurt (Just et al., 2002) or titillate us with undercover video of 
prostitute solicitation (Gauthier, 2011b). Lewis (2014) said local TV has abandoned its 
obligation to serve the public with quality reporting, surmising that an increasing number of 
stations now take a “dumb and dumber” approach to news. 
 The current project gives some empirical support to this criticism. Only a small 
proportion of the stories analyzed were investigative, and most of the stories that were presented 
as investigative were actually not. Downs (1957) postulated that most people are not motivated 
to seek out political information because they believe it is not worth the effort. If this is true, the 
majority of citizens will acquire useful public affairs information only if it is available through 
their favored means of communication. Because local TV is the most relied-upon form of news, 
many will not receive valuable information about society’s leaders if stations do not provide a 
healthy amount of quality investigative reporting. 
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 In spite of these negative indicators, analysis results from the current project provide 
hope for investigative news. Most survey respondents indicated that their newsrooms were 
placing an increasing emphasis on investigative reporting, and some studies support this 
optimism (Jones, 2013; Willnat & Weaver, 2014). Three years ago, local television stations 
unexpectedly swept the most prestigious investigative awards in the yearly IRE competition, 
showing that local TV can still produce journalism that is as good or better than any other 
medium (“Local TV Entries,” 2012). It is possible that after a long decline in the early part of 
this century, local television managers are now ramping up investigative efforts, although the 
present study suggests newsroom enthusiasm might be outpacing content. 
 This dissertation helps fill research gaps regarding the amount and quality of 
investigative journalism being produced in America, and provides needed clues regarding the 
relationship between corporations and news production. Because publicly traded companies were 
associated with more investigative journalism, more research on how corporations are affecting 
news is warranted. Since the completion of this project’s survey in early 2014, corporations such 
as Sinclair and Gannett have purchased several more local TV stations, further increasing the 
prevalence of corporate-owned news (Matsa, 2015; Mitchell, 2014). A qualitative study 
examining corporate news structure and executives’ relationships with news managers could 
reveal important information about the influence of corporations, and why they might be 
producing more investigative reporting. 
 This project also showed a connection between increased profit emphasis and decreased 
investigative emphasis, but many more questions in this area remain unanswered, including: Is 
the quest for profit anathema to investigative news, or do these stories actually improve ratings 
by providing consumers with a recognizable quality project? And, are news managers starting to 
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see investigative reporting as a viable business model? Belt and Just (2008) showed evidence 
that investigative journalism can produce higher ratings, and consumers have expressed their 
demand for this type of news (Jones, 2013). Additionally, some survey respondents in this 
project detailed how their stations had become successful by making investigative reporting a top 
priority. Though building an investigative “presence” takes time, local TV news managers could 
better serve employees, shareholders, and the public by investing in this impactful news format.    
 To further flesh out variables influencing investigative journalism, future researchers 
could use different operationalizations of the independent factors in this study. For instance, 
profit emphasis could be measured by financial records, news staff size could be determined 
through employment records, and competition could be measured by Nielsen market shares. The 
influence of these factors might also be brought into sharper focus if a larger sample of stations 
were drawn for analysis, if content analysis data were collected at the same time as the survey, 
and if newscasts from sweeps and non-sweeps periods were examined. Such methods were 
outside the scope of this project, but might help further determine the conditions under which 
investigative journalism is produced. Additionally, analyses of other media such as 
documentaries and the Internet, which may be taking the place of traditional investigative news, 
could yield valuable information about the future of this kind of reporting. 
 As has been the case for many years, investigative journalism is frequently contingent on 
effort. Some organizational factors in this study failed to explain investigative production, but an 
organization’s commitment to serving the public good will almost always lead to more and better 
investigations, and when managers provide little support, determined investigators will often find 
a way. One small-market survey respondent wrote, “90% of the investigative work I do is done 
on my own time. I commit an extra 20 hours a week to investigative reporting because I enjoy it 
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and I know how important it is to our viewers.” Of course, investigative journalism needs 
financial support and encouragement in order to thrive as a whole, and the health of this kind of 
reporting tells us much about the health of journalism in general. One survey respondent said 
investigative news “is the one element of news media keeping this business alive.” If 
investigative reporting is indeed the lifeblood of journalism, we should continue to assess its 
status and explore the factors that regulate its production if we are to ensure its survival. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 88
TABLES 
 
Table 1. Results of Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation of Survey 
Respondent Scores/Ratings 
Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Investigative Emphasis    
      Station Investigative Increased .821 .292 .089 
      Quality of Investigative Improved .816 .347 .068 
      Time Spent on Investigative Increased .791 .092 .287 
      Investigative Airtime Increased .724 .516 .126 
      Investigative 2-Month Projects Increased .651 .091 .345 
      Investigative Staff Increased .617 .295 .338 
      Investigative Reporters Have Adequate Time .529 .211 .339 
      Station Allows Airtime for Thorough Investigative .528 .517 .337 
Investigative Awareness    
      Reporters Think Investigative is Important .088 .838 .165 
      News Directors Think Investigative is Important .416 .667 .085 
      Investigative is Given Prominent Airtime .342 .665 .391 
Personal Productivity/Staff    
      I Spend Most of My Time on Investigative .454 .090 .774 
      Number of Investigative Reporters at Station -.027 .281 .744 
      Amount of My Work that is Investigative .464 .150 .709 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 4.572 2.587 2.416 
Total % of Variance Explained 32.7 18.5 17.3 
Cum. % of Variance Explained 32.7 51.1 68.4 
Factor loadings greater than .520 are displayed    
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Presence of Investigative Characteristics in Content-Analyzed Stories 
 All Stories 
(N=398) 
Investigative-Branded 
Stories (N=86) 
Concealed Information 17.6% 65.1% 
Public Interest 30.2% 59.3% 
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Table 3. Investigative Scores for All Stories in Content Analysis (N=398) 
Score Number of Stories Percentage 
0 254 63.8% 
1 98 24.6% 
2 46 11.6% 
Total 398 100% 
0 = No Investigative Characteristics (i.e., “Concealed Information” and “Public Interest”) 
1 = One Investigative Characteristic 
2 = Two Investigative Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Investigative Branding for All Stories in Content Analysis (N=398)  
 Number of Stories Percentage 
No Investigative Branding 312 78.4% 
Investigative Branding 86 21.6% 
Total 398 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Investigative Scores for Branded Stories in Content Analysis (N=86) 
Score Number of Stories Percentage 
0 17 19.8% 
1 31 36.0% 
2 38 44.2% 
Total 86 100% 
0 = No Investigative Characteristics (i.e., “Concealed Information,” “Public Interest”) 
1 = One Investigative Characteristic 
2 = Two Investigative Characteristics 
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Table 6. Length of All Stories in Content Analysis 
Category Stories Mean Length (sec.) SD Category Stories Mean Length (sec.) SD 
Non-branded 312 153.16*** 45.89 Not Fully Investigative 352 153.96*** 44.44 
Investigative-branded 86 193.05*** 73.68 Fully Investigative 46 221.61*** 87.45 
Total 398    398   
*** = Mean difference within column significant at p< .001 
Note: Story length was measured from when a reporter started talking or when a story “package” started, whichever came first, to 
when a reporter finished talking or when a story “package” ended, whichever came last.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Length of Investigative-Branded Stories in Content Analysis 
Category Stories Mean Length (sec.) SD 
Not Fully Investigative 48 169.27** 53.10 
Fully Investigative 38 223.08** 85.02 
Total 86   
*** = Mean difference within column significant at p< .01 
Note: Story length was measured from when a reporter started talking or when a story “package” started, whichever came first, to 
when a reporter finished talking or when a story “package” ended, whichever came last.  
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Table 8. Means and Bivariate Correlations (Pearson’s r) for Key Variables (N=165) 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Profit Emphasis 3.80 1.09     
2. Staff Size 53.60 39.54 .02    
3. Market Size (households) 762432.97 915481.56 -.01 .57***   
4. Competition (stations) 7.29 3.52 -.05 .52*** .72***  
5. Investigative Emphasis 3.13 1.08 -.21** .31*** .25** .20* 
* = p< .05       
** = p< .01       
*** = p< .001       
 
 
 
Table 9. Means and Bivariate Correlations (Pearson’s r) for Key Variables Measured by Each Station (N=80) 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Profit Emphasis 3.79 1.35          
2. Staff Size 65.73 45.99 -.08         
3. Market Size (Households) 1023452.38 1159883.75 -.02 .53***        
4. Competition (Stations) 8.16 3.66 -.04 .51*** .75***       
5. Full Investigative % .11 .19 -.18 .23* .22+ .19      
6. Branded Investigative % .19 .24 -.16 .29* .22+ .17 .77***     
7. Quality Index 1.25 .59 .02 -.10 .11 -.01 .64*** .14    
8. Investigative Length (seconds) 198.40 74.66 .05 .03 -.13 -.14 .28+ -.01 .50**   
9. Non-Investigative % .58 .38 .02 .04 -.06 .07 -.74*** -.27 -.88*** -.52**  
10. Investigative Emphasis 3.28 1.12 -.25* .28* .27* .27* .34** .37** .36* .17 -.38* 
+ = p<.10             
* = p<.05            
** = p<.01            
*** = p<.001            
Full Investigative % = fully investigative stories (with an investigative score of “2”)/total stories 
Branded Investigative % = investigative-branded stories/total stories 
Quality Index = total investigative score for branded stories/total number of branded stories 
Non-Investigative % = number of branded stories with an investigative score of “0” or “1”/total number of branded stories 
 9
2
Table 10. Regression Predicting Investigative Quantity 
  % Full 
Investigative 
   % Branded 
Investigative 
  
 B SE β P B SE β P 
Profit Emphasis -.030 .021 -.160 .163 -.031 .026 -.131 .235 
Ownership (1=Public) .041 .047 .108 .388 .127 .058 .263 .031* 
Staff Size .001 .001 .140 .310 .001 .001 .171 .203 
Market Size (Households) .000 .000 .209 .247 .000 .000 .060 .733 
Competition (Stations) -.007 .009 -.143 .410 -.002 .011 -.035 .833 
         
F(5, 70) 1.77    2.80*    
R2 11.2%    16.7%    
* = p< .05         
** = p< .01         
*** = p< .001         
B = Unstandardized regression coefficient (beta) 
SE = Standard error of unstandardized coefficient 
β = Standardized regression coefficient 
P = Significance level 
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Table 11. Regression Predicting Investigative Quality 
  Quality 
Index 
   Investigative 
Length 
  
 B SE β P B SE β P 
Profit Emphasis -.001 .100 -.003 .988 5.166 12.570 .071 .684 
Ownership (1=Public) -.087 .237 -.071 .715 -24.818 29.794 -.160 .411 
Staff Size -.001 .002 -.124 .530 .221 .275 .156 .427 
Market Size (Households) .000 .000 .318 .243 -2.188E-6 .000 -.043 .874 
Competition (Stations) -.026 .038 -.180 .490 -2.336 4.750 -.127 .626 
         
F(5, 32) .35    .39    
R2 5.2%    5.8%    
* = p< .05         
** = p< .01         
*** = p< .001         
B = Unstandardized regression coefficient (beta) 
SE = Standard error of unstandardized coefficient 
β = Standardized regression coefficient 
P = Significance level 
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Table 12. Regression Predicting Investigative Emphasis 
 B SE β P 
Profit Emphasis -.218 .072 -.220 .003** 
Ownership (1=Public) .369 .165 .170 .027* 
Staff Size .007 .002 .241 .008** 
Market Size (Households) .000 .000 .078 .488 
Competition (Stations) -.010 .033 -.032 .766 
     
F(5, 159) 6.62***    
R2 17.2%    
* = p< .05     
** = p< .01     
*** = p< .001     
B = Unstandardized regression coefficient (beta) 
SE = Standard error of unstandardized coefficient 
β = Standardized regression coefficient 
P = Significance level 
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Appendix A 
Survey Questionnaire 
 
 
Please answer these first few questions by circling the number which matches your answer. 
 
1. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement: “In general, the 
news media’s commitment to investigative reporting is as strong today as it was a year or two ago.” 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
3 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
4 
Somewhat 
Agree 
5 
Strongly Agree 
 
2. Thinking about your station’s news over the past year or so, please indicate whether the amount of 
investigative journalism at your station has decreased significantly, decreased somewhat, remained 
the same, increased somewhat, or increased significantly. 
  
1 
Significantly 
Decreased 
2 
Somewhat 
Decreased 
3 
Remained the 
Same 
4 
Somewhat 
Increased 
5 
Significantly 
Increased 
 
3. How satisfied are you with your present job? 
 
1 
Very Dissatisfied 
2 
Somewhat 
Dissatisfied 
3 
Neither Satisfied 
nor Dissatisfied 
4 
Somewhat 
Satisfied 
5 
Very Satisfied 
 
4. Thinking about your work in the past year or so, how much of your reporting do you consider to be 
investigative? 
  
1 
None of My 
Reporting is 
Investigative 
2 
Some of My 
Reporting is 
Investigative 
3 
About Half of 
My Reporting is 
Investigative 
4 
Most of My 
Reporting is 
Investigative 
5 
All of My 
Reporting is 
Investigative 
 
5. Has an investigative story you’ve produced ever won an award or been nominated for an award? 
 
0 
No 
1 
Yes 
 
6. For how many years have you been a television reporter? _________ (fill in blank) 
 
7. For how many years have you been conducting investigative reports? __________ (fill in blank) 
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Thinking about your investigative work in the past year or so, please indicate how strongly you 
agree or disagree with the following statements by circling the number which corresponds with 
your level of agreement: 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
8.  
I have a great deal of 
freedom to select my own 
stories. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. 
I have a great deal of 
freedom to decide which 
aspects of a story should be 
emphasized. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. 
I spend most of my time 
working on investigative 
reports, in comparison to 
other forms of journalism. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. 
The amount of time I spend 
on investigative journalism, 
in comparison to other news 
stories, has increased. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. 
The total number of staff 
members at my station 
assigned to work on 
investigative projects 
(reporters, researchers, 
producers, photographers, 
etc.) has increased. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. 
The number of investigative 
projects I’ve worked on that 
took longer than two months 
to prepare has increased. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. 
I often feel pressure to alter 
an investigative story 
because of its potential to 
embarrass our station’s 
advertisers. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Thinking about your work in the past year or so, please indicate how relevant the following 
characteristics are in your investigative stories by circling the number which corresponds to your level 
of agreement: 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
15. 
My investigative stories are in 
the public interest (e.g., topics 
which involve government, 
large corporations, or other 
powerful entities affecting 
large numbers of people). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. 
My investigative stories reveal 
information that someone 
wants suppressed or is for 
other reasons concealed from 
the public. (e.g., revealing that 
the military covered up 
information about sexual 
assaults). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. 
In my investigative stories, I 
pursue the main issues of each 
story beyond allegation and 
denial (e.g., looking for 
evidence of government 
corruption despite an official’s 
denials). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. 
My investigative stories reveal 
new information and/or bring 
together information that is 
already public in a way that is 
revealing (e.g., analyzing 
government receipts to show a 
misuse of public funds). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. 
My investigative stories alert 
viewers to systemic failures 
and/or point out where society 
is failing or falling short of 
expected standards (e.g., 
mistreatment of patients at a 
large hospital). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
20. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 indicates “Extremely Unlikely,” 5 indicates “Neither Likely nor 
Unlikely,” and 10 indicates “Extremely Likely,” please write down a number along the scale below 
which indicates how likely you are to still be working at your current job in five years. 
 
                0 ------------------------------------------5-----------------------------------------10 
 Extremely Unlikely  Neither Likely nor Unlikely  Extremely Likely 
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The next few questions concern investigative journalism at your station as a whole. Please indicate 
how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements by circling the number which 
corresponds to your answer: 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
21. 
Reporters at my station 
are given adequate time to 
cover investigative news 
stories. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. 
Investigative news 
routinely is given 
prominent air time at my 
station. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. 
My station routinely 
allows air time for 
thorough investigative 
news coverage. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. 
Reporters in my 
newsroom think 
investigative reporting is 
the most important 
assignment at my station. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. 
My news director thinks 
investigative reporting is 
the most important 
assignment at my station. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
26. 
During the past year or 
so, airtime devoted to 
investigative news at my 
station has increased. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. 
During the past year or 
so, the quality of 
investigative news at my 
station has improved. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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The following questions are about your news organization. Please indicate how strongly you agree or 
disagree with the following statements by circling the number which corresponds to your answer: 
  
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
28. 
My news organization places 
a great deal of importance on 
open communication between 
ownership and news 
employees. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
29. 
My news organization places 
a great deal of importance on 
earning high, above-average 
profits. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
30. 
My news organization places 
a great deal of importance on 
maintaining high employee 
morale. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
31. 
My news organization places 
a great deal of importance on 
keeping the size of our 
audience as large as possible. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
32. 
My news organization places 
a great deal of importance on 
producing high-quality 
journalism. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
33. 
Over the past year or so, 
newsroom resources at my 
station have been shrinking. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
For the next two questions, please circle the number which corresponds to your answer. 
 
34. Is your news organization owned by a public corporation whose shares are traded on a stock 
exchange? 
 
0. No 
1. Yes (which corporation? ______________________________________________________) 
2. Don’t Know 
 
35. Is the person or company that owns your news organization located in your town or city? 
 
0. No 
1. Yes 
2. Don’t Know 
 
36. How many full-time news employees work at your station? ____________ (fill in the blank) 
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These next questions deal with what is most important to you about working in journalism. Please 
indicate the level of importance of each goal by circling the number which corresponds with your 
answer: 
 
 
 Not 
Important 
at All 
Fairly 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important nor 
Unimportant 
Fairly 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
37. 
Getting information to 
the public quickly. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
38. 
Providing analysis and 
interpretation of complex 
problems. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
39. 
Providing entertainment 
and relaxation. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
40. 
Investigating claims and 
statements made by the 
government. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
41. 
Providing analysis and 
interpretation of 
international 
developments. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
42. 
Staying away from 
stories where factual 
content cannot be 
verified. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
43. 
Concentrating on news 
that’s of interest to the 
widest possible audience. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
44. 
Discussing national 
policy while it is still 
being developed. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
45. 
Developing intellectual 
and cultural interests of 
the public. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
46. 
Being an adversary of 
public officials by being 
constantly skeptical of 
their actions. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
47. 
Being an adversary of 
businesses by being 
constantly skeptical of 
their actions. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
48. 
Setting the political 
agenda. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
49. 
Giving ordinary people a 
chance to express their 
views on public affairs.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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 Not 
Important 
at All 
Fairly 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important nor 
Unimportant 
Fairly 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
50. 
Motivating ordinary people 
to get involved in public 
discussions of important 
issues. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
51. 
Pointing people toward 
possible solutions to 
society’s problems. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
You’re almost done with the survey…fewer than ten questions to go. This section of the 
questionnaire deals with how you incorporate social media into your daily reporting routine.  
 
52. First of all, how many professional social media websites (Twitter, Facebook, etc.) do you currently 
maintain? (Professional social media websites are defined as websites that you use as part of your job 
rather than websites you use primarily to communicate with friends and family). 
 
Number of professional social media websites:   ___________ (fill in the blank) 
 
 
Thinking about your professional use of social media over the past year or so, please indicate your 
level of agreement with these statements by circling the number which corresponds with your answer: 
  
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
53. 
I often use social media to 
interact with the public and 
provide a forum for feedback. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
54. 
I often use social media to 
generate story ideas (e.g., asking 
for viewer feedback on a certain 
story idea, investigating a viewer 
comment that eventually turns 
into a story, etc.). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
55. 
I often use social media to assist 
in the production of stories (e.g., 
research, contacting sources, 
obtaining information, etc.). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Changing topics now. The following questions deal with financial and other personal information. 
Once again, all information you provide will be treated in strict confidence, and neither you nor 
your organization will ever be linked by name to this information. 
 
56. What was your age on your last birthday? ________ (fill in the blank) 
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For the next three questions, please circle the number which corresponds to your answer. 
 
57. What is your gender? 
 
1 
Female 
2 
Male 
 
58. What is your ethnicity? 
  
1 
Caucasian 
2 
African-
American 
3 
Hispanic 
4 
Native 
American 
5 
Asian 
6 
Other 
 
59. Please indicate your total personal income, before taxes, from your work in journalism during the past 
year. Again, this information will be kept confidential. 
 
1. Less than $15,000 
2. Between $15,000 and $29,999 
3. Between $30,000 and $44,999 
4. Between $45,000 and $59,999 
5. Between $60,000 and $74,999 
6. Between $75,000 and $89,999 
7. Between $90,000 and $104,999 
8. Between $105,000 and $119,999 
9. Between $120,000 and $134,999 
10. Between $135,000 and $149,999 
11. $150,000 or over 
 
60. Finally, this question is important to our understanding of investigative journalism as a whole. In your 
own words, what is the biggest obstacle facing the production of investigative journalism at your 
station? (Please use as much space for your answer as necessary, including the back of the page) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for participating. Please return the completed survey in the provided envelope. If 
you would like the results of this survey sent to you, please write your email address here: 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix B 
Coding Protocol 
 
Introduction: This study examines local television investigative journalism stories to 
determine the amount, the quality, and the emphasis on this form of news at stations across the 
country. A constructed week of newscasts (M-F) will be drawn from a random sampling of 
stations that employ investigative journalists. The unit of analysis is each station’s newscast. 
This particular analysis is part of a larger project examining the overall state of and influences on 
investigative television journalism. 
 
Background: Critics and scholars have speculated about the status of investigative 
journalism for many years, but few studies have empirically tested the state of this news genre. 
Investigative news fulfills the all-important “watchdog” function that aims to help democracy by 
informing citizens about powerful institutions. Across all media, resources have been reduced 
over the past decade, which might indicate a decline in the resource-intensive practice of 
investigative reporting. However, recent studies have indicated that investigations might be 
taking on a more prominent role at news outlets. Local television remains the top source for 
news among adults, making it a significant testing ground.  
 
Method: Content analysis involves the systematic assignment of communication content 
to categories according to definitions and rules, and the analysis of relationships involving those 
categories, often with the purpose of drawing inferences to antecedent or subsequent conditions 
or events. Analysis should be based on content only and should be free from coder bias and 
personal opinion. 
 
Procedure: Coders should read the protocol before each coding session, and refer to it 
during coding. Coding sessions should last no more than four hours at a time to prevent fatigue. 
Specific coding instructions and operational definitions of key variables are explained below. 
 
1. Coder ID – Identification number of each unique coder: 
(1) Jesse Abdenour 
(2) Justin Blankenship 
(3) Diane Francis 
 
2. Series Number – number corresponding to the newscast being examined. 
 
3. Station ID – number corresponding to the station being examined. 
 
4. City – the principal city from which the newscast originated. 
 
5. Call Letters – Call letters (WOIO, KING, etc.) of the station being examined. 
 
6. DMA – Market ranking (11, 156, etc.) of the station being examined. 
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7. Day – Day of the week. 
 
8. Date – Month/day (11/25, 2/10, etc.) when the newscast aired. 
 
9. Time – Time of day (10, 11, etc.) when the newscast aired. PM shows. 
 
Identifying Stories to Code: Coders should analyze every news “package” story that 
begins within the first 15 minutes of a newscast, is a FULL two minutes in length, and is an 
original, locally produced story. In addition, coders should analyze any package that is 
introduced or teased as expressly “investigative” within the first 15 minutes, regardless of story 
length and position of the story in the newscast. 
 
Package: a story that includes a recorded reporter voice track. 
Newscast Length: a newscast begins either when the main “show open” appears, or 
when a tease or “cold open” appears immediately before the show open, whichever 
comes first. 
Story Length: a story starts either when the reporter begins talking, or the package 
 begins, whichever comes first. A story ends either when the reporter is done talking, or 
 the package ends, whichever comes last. 
Locally Produced Story: a story featuring a reporter or anchor from the local station. 
News packages that do not feature a local reporter should not be coded. 
Expressly “Investigative”: a story introduced or teased using any form of the word 
“investigate” (“investigation,” “I-Team,” “Channel 6 investigates,” “News 4 
investigator,” etc.). The investigative word or phrase should refer to the station’s activity, 
and not the activity of an outside party. For instance, mention of a police “investigation” 
would not qualify. 
• If a package is introduced or teased as expressly “investigative” within the first 15 
minutes of a show, it should be coded in all instances, even if it is less than two 
minutes in length, and even if the story begins after the 15-minute mark. 
 
If, within the first 15 minutes, there are no stories that fit the preceding description, 
coders are done with that newscast. For each story fitting the above description, please code 
according to the following instructions: 
 
10. Investigative Branding – indicate if a story was introduced or teased using any form of 
the word “investigate” (“investigation,” “I-Team,” “Channel 6 investigates,” “News 4 
investigator,” etc.). The investigative word or phrase should refer to the station’s activity, 
and not the activity of an outside party. For instance, mention of a police “investigation” 
would not qualify (1=yes, 0=no). 
 
11. Tease – indicate if the story was previewed in a short “tease” segment. A tease could 
appear at the beginning of the show or in the middle of a show (1=yes, 0=no). 
 
12. Lead – indicate if the story led the newscast (1=yes, 0=no). A lead story is defined as the 
first substantive story in the newscast. It is usually, but not always, after the initial anchor 
introductions. 
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13. Block – indicate the show block in which the story appeared (e.g., A). The initial 
segment of consecutive news stories before the first commercial break is the “A” block. 
The second segment of consecutive news stories before the second commercial break is 
the “B” block, and so on. 
 
14. Position – indicate the position of the story within the show block (e.g., the second story 
in a block would be marked as “2”). Sports stories and weather segments count; teases do 
not count. 
 
15. Length – indicate the length of the story in seconds (e.g., 182). A story starts either when 
the reporter begins talking, or when the package begins, whichever comes first. A story 
ends either when the reporter is done talking, or when the package ends, whichever 
comes last. 
 
Investigative Characteristics: Coders are expected to judge whether each investigative 
characteristic is present within a story. Investigative characteristics are drawn from the following 
definition of investigative journalism: a story must reveal information that was concealed 
from the public, and it must be in the public interest. Each characteristic is discussed further 
below. 
 
16. Concealed Information – The reporter reveals information that was concealed from the 
public. To determine whether this standard has been met, consider the following criteria 
regarding the information revealed in the story: (examples provided) 
 
 A. Was someone trying to hide it? 
  
o interviews with former and current military members establishing that rape 
and sexual harassment within the armed forces is tolerated, and often not 
reported, despite denials by military officials. 
o internal memos or emails establishing that U.S. officials had knowledge of the 
killing of innocent civilians in a war zone, despite denial by the government. 
o interviews and documents showing that the mayor fired city employees to 
keep them quiet about official misconduct 
 
 B. Was it concealed by law? 
 
o student records, protected by FERPA, demonstrating that college athletes 
received passing grades for fake classes 
o classified government records showing that the CIA was spying on American 
Muslims 
o confidential hospital records showing that a patient did not receive proper 
medical care 
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 C. Was it available to the public, but compiled by the reporter in a way that 
exposes a widespread pattern? 
 
o hours of public police dashboard videos revealing patterns of racial profiling 
on traffic stops 
o public tax documents and receipts establishing that city employees are abusing 
public funds by taking unnecessary vacations and buying expensive dinners 
o interviews with law officials and witnesses establishing that a man convicted 
of murder did not receive a fair trial 
 
If you checked a box beside EITHER A, B, or C, mark “1” for Concealed Information 
(variable 16). If you did not check any of the boxes, mark “0”. 
 
 
17. Public Interest – The story must be in the public interest. To determine whether this 
standard has been met, consider the following criteria regarding the information revealed 
in the story: 
  
A. Have citizen(s) been harmed in any of the following areas? 
 
Health 
 
 
 
Quality of Life 
 
 
 
Safety 
 
 
 
Money or Property 
 
 
 
 
B. Does a party responsible for the harm that occurred fall in any of the following 
categories? (examples provided) 
 
Government 
 
 
 
Public Institution 
 
 
 
Large Private Entity 
 
 
 
(Police Department) (Public University) (Corporation) 
(City Council) (Public High School) (Private Hospital) 
 
If you checked at least one box in BOTH A & B, write “1” for Public Interest (variable 
17). If you did not check at least one box in both A & B, write “0”. 
 
 
18. Slug – Write the essence of the story in four words or less. 
 
19. Story Count – On the Excel coding document, indicate in every row corresponding to 
the station being examined the number of stories you coded within the newscast. (e.g., 2). 
Leave at least one row for each newscast. Delete rows that are not used. 
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